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## Procuring Firm Growth: The Effects of Government Purchases on Firm Dynamics\*

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Firms in the developing world exhibit much flatter life-cycle dynamics compared to firms in developed countries. This paper examines the role of demand constraints in limiting the growth of small and medium firms in Brazil. We test whether firms that win government procurement contracts grow more compared to frem that compete for these contracts but do not win. We assemble a comprehensive data set combining matched employer-employee data for the unieroe of formal firms in Brazil with the universe of federal government procurement outract topfolding a quasi-experimental design, we find that winning at least one contract in a give matter increases firm growth by 2.2 percentage points over that quarter, with 97% of the re-tires coming from either memployment or the informal sector. These effects also penist we beyond the length of the contracts. Part of this persistence comes from firms participating and wining more future auctions, as well as penetrating other markets.

Keywords: Firm growth, Demand shocks, Government purchases

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