Can Community Policing Improve Police-Community Relations in an Authoritarian Regime? Experimental Evidence from Uganda[*]

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Abstract

Throughout the developing world, citizens distrust the police and hesitate to bring crimes to their attention—a suboptimal equilibrium that makes it difficult for the police to effectively combat crime and violence. Community policing has been touted as one solution to this problem, but evidence on its efficacy in developing country contexts is sparse. We present results from a large-scale field experiment that randomly assigned a home-grown community policing intervention to police stations throughout rural Uganda. Drawing on administrative crime data and close to 4,000 interviews with citizens, police officers, and local authorities, we show that community policing had limited effects on core outcomes such as crime, insecurity, and perceptions of the police. We attribute these findings to a combination of turnover, treatment non-compliance, and resource constraints. Our study draws attention to the limits of community policing's potential to reduce crime and build trust in the developing world.

Reducing crime and improving personal and communal security are among the most basic functions of any modern state. The task of achieving these goals naturally falls first and foremost on a country's police force. Police forces are most effective at preventing and investigating crimes when they establish cooperative and mutually respectful relationships with citizens (Tyler and Huo 2002). Police officers also constitute the first "face of government" for many citizens (Soss and Weaver 2017, 584), and police-community relations are often emblematic of state-society relations more generally. Improving police-community relations is thus a first-order concern in much of the Global South—and, indeed, in much of the Global North as well, as recent worldwide protests against police brutality attest.

Against a backdrop of general distrust in the police, especially in areas plagued by poverty and crime (Magaloni and Rodriguez 2020), community-oriented policing (COP, or community policing for short) has been touted as a key reform to build trust and increase collaboration between officers and citizens (Skogan and Hartnett 1999; Greene and Mastrofski 1988). COP is designed to improve the frequency and quality of contact between civilians and the police through mechanisms such as foot patrols, town hall meetings, and door-to-door visits with individual households. There is a growing body of evidence from consolidated industrial democracies that COP can reduce crime (e.g., Hinkle et al. 2020; Wood, Tyler and Papachristos 2020). By contrast, the effectiveness of COP in low-income countries is an open question, with important theoretical and policy implications that remain largely unexplored.[1]

In this study, we use a field experiment to test the effects of a homegrown COP program in Uganda. Uganda offers an important test case for the effectiveness of community policing in a developing country context. Recent studies of COP in the developing world have focused on settings where police forces are severely resource constrained, but where they are nonetheless (largely) insulated from political interference by democratically elected

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[1]A systematic review by Blair (2020a, 4) finds that, with a handful of recent exceptions (notably, Blair, Karim and Morse 2019; Karim 2020), credible studies assessing the effect of community policing are nearly all from the U.S., the U.K., and Australia.

governments (Blair, Karim and Morse 2019; Karim 2020). This is not the case in Uganda. As in virtually all authoritarian regimes, the Uganda Police Force (UPF) lacks independence from political influence, and the ruling party routinely misuses the UPF's coercive capability to advance its partisan goals, especially in the months preceding national elections (Curtice and Berhlendorf 2020).

Meanwhile, Ugandans of all political stripes face challenges of crime and insecurity that the UPF is constitutionally mandated to address. Local advocates of COP hope that establishing closer, more cooperative relationships between civilians and the UPF will not only improve citizens' perceptions of rank-and-file officers, but will also improve officers' responsiveness to citizens, regardless of their political affiliation, thus mitigating crime and insecurity. In this way, COP may help citizens delink the UPF as a national-level institution—one that is quite transparently allied with the ruling party—from UPF officers at the local level, who may be less obviously politicized (even if they still engage in other forms of misconduct). To our knowledge, this proposition has never been rigorously tested, in Uganda or in any other authoritarian regime.

The program we evaluate represents a realistic best case scenario for COP in a setting like Uganda. On the one hand, the program was in some respects a best case scenario. Both the UPF and the country's political leaders have formally adopted community policing as a guiding principle, though implementation of COP had been uneven and haphazard prior to our study. COP is a potentially politically sensitive reform; the program we evaluate was designed and implemented by the UPF with input from Ugandan civil society groups, as well as the Ministry of Justice, thus ensuring a degree of local ownership and buy-in that we anticipated would be indispensable for success (Honig 2018). The structure of the program represents what Ugandan stakeholders believed was the most effective model given local conditions, subject to tight budget constraints.

On the other hand, the UPF was not in a position to devote significant financial or human resources to ensure compliance among rank-and-file officers, especially in rural

areas, where monitoring is difficult and principal-agent problems between leadership and the rank-and-file are severe. Moreover, beyond the UPF's association with the ruling party, individual UPF officers have been documented engaging in routine acts of malfeasance and petty corruption—problems that strain police-community relations in countries around the world. Indeed, trust in the police is low in Uganda, and the UPF is consistently described as the most corrupt public institution in the country (Kewaza 2016).[2] The program was thus realistic in that it occurred against the backdrop of myriad preexisting challenges, many of which are typical of less developed countries (Tankebe 2010). Whether community policing can be effective in such a setting is not clear.

The low-cost, scalable COP program we study was designed by the UPF in collaboration with the Youth Integrated Development Organization (YIDO), a local civil society group with many years of experience training Ugandan police officers. The program was inspired in part by Uganda's earlier attempts at community policing, described below. YIDO trained UPF officers in sampled police stations in 13 districts spanning Uganda's four regions. These officers then conducted recurring town hall meetings and sporadic foot patrols in randomly selected treatment communities over a period of more than a year. We study the effects of the program using a combination of survey, behavioral, and administrative data.

Disappointingly, we find that COP in Uganda had little to no effect on most of our pre-registered outcomes. Most notably, we find little to no evidence that the program reduced the prevalence of crime, increased citizens' perceptions of personal safety, or improved their assessments of the UPF's intentions, capacity, or responsiveness. These nulls are consistent across subgroups of citizens whose views we might most hope to change—in particular, opponents of the ruling party and those who expressed dissatisfaction or fear of the UPF at baseline. If anything, these individuals appear to have been disproportionately negatively affected by the intervention.

We do find, however, that the COP program increased the frequency of interactions

[2]See, for example, the 2008, 2012, and 2015 Afrobarometer surveys.

between civilians and the police, including suggestive evidence of an increase in crime reporting. The program also improved Ugandans' understanding of the criminal justice system. This may help explain the apparent increase in crime reporting, since misunderstanding of criminal law may discourage victims and witnesses from reporting cases to the police (Blair, Karim and Morse 2019). Improved understanding of the criminal justice system may also help Ugandans recognize and report acts of police misconduct.

Perhaps relatedly (and contrary to our expectations), we find suggestive evidence of a modest increase in the incidence of "unofficial payments" made to UPF officers. Specifically, 9.8% of respondents in treatment villages reported having made an informal payment to UPF officers in the past six months, compared to 7.3% of respondents in control villages. This raises the possibility that Uganda's COP program had the adverse unintended consequence of exacerbating petty corruption. We note, however, that the statistical significance of this result does not survive a multiple comparisons correction, and that it may be an artifact of more benign (perhaps even beneficial) improvements in citizens' understanding of what does and does not constitute an unofficial payment under Ugandan law.

Our study's (mostly) null results run counter to our publicly pre-registered hypotheses,[3] and any attempt to explain them is inevitably post-hoc. With this caveat in mind, we note that while we do observe statistically significant differences in the frequency of police-citizen interactions between the treatment and control groups, the program nonetheless suffered from low levels of treatment compliance, compounded by routine turnover, inadequate top-down supervision, and, relatedly, weak incentives for rank-and-file officers to engage more proactively in the program. We speculate that these problems may help explain the program's generally underwhelming results, even in the face of high-level buy-in and local ownership with respect to program design and implementation.

Our study contributes to research on possible ways to improve police-community rela-

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[3]Our pre-analysis plan (PAP) was pre-registered with the Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP) network prior to endline data collection. The link to the EGAP website has been blinded for peer review, but an anonymized version of the PAP is available at https://www.dropbox.com/s/p8cqwvz80v3vy72/PAP_anon.pdf?dl=0.

tions in settings where baseline levels of trust and cooperation are low. This research agenda is both timely and globally salient, as has been made abundantly clear by the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement and the corresponding wave of mass protests against police misconduct in countries around the world, from the U.S. to France, Australia, and Nigeria. While community policing programs are often touted as a promising means to heal past wounds and repair deeply damaged relations between citizens and the police, our results cast doubt on the efficacy of these initiatives, at least in settings similar to Uganda. Our study thus places potentially important scope conditions on the usefulness of COP for reducing crime and building trust in the state's security apparatus.

1 Theoretical framework

1.1 Barriers to citizen cooperation with the police

Police forces are tasked with addressing domestic threats to security, ensuring the safety and rights of citizens, and promoting the rule of law. The more competently and fairly the police accomplish these tasks, the more legitimate they and the rest of the state apparatus are generally perceived to be (Sunshine and Tyler 2003). Effective, legitimate police forces build confidence among individuals, business owners, and investors that their rights will be upheld, and that they can rely on state institutions to resolve disputes without recourse to violence. A competent and trusted police force also helps protect the rights of historically marginalized groups by, for example, increasing reporting and prosecution of sexual and gender-based violence and offenses against ethnic, racial, and religious minorities (Jassal 2020; Nanes 2020)—crimes that are too often neglected in weak states (Heise, Ellsberg and Gottmoeller 2002).

In many developing countries, however, the police are widely distrusted, and citizens assume that seeking redress through the state security and justice sectors will prove futile or prohibitively expensive (Blair 2020b). Many citizens also fear that engaging with these

institutions will subject them to corruption and abuse (Karim 2020). As a result, they often opt to bypass the police and courts altogether, relying instead on illegal or extrajudicial mechanisms (e.g. vigilantism and mob justice) of dispute resolution (Wilke 2020), or allowing criminal cases to go unresolved, thus heightening the risk of future escalation.

Community policing programs are predicated on the idea that the efficacy of any police force depends crucially on citizen cooperation (Greene and Mastrofski 1988). If this is true in countries like the U.S. and U.K., where the concept of community policing originated, then it is especially true in most countries in the Global South, where police forces tend to operate under tight resource constraints. Citizens are a source of valuable information about where crime is happening, and who is committing it. While police forces could, in principle, gather this information on their own, doing so is challenging, time-consuming, and labor-intensive. Where citizens provide reliable information consistently and willingly, police officers can better allocate their limited time and resources.

Citizen cooperation can take many forms: for example, reporting crimes, providing investigators with information to help them solve crimes, or agreeing to serve as witnesses when offenders are brought to justice. Citizens are also well positioned to know which streets, neighborhoods, and communities are "hot spots" for crime. This is especially valuable in developing countries where the police have limited capacity for accurate crime mapping (Blattman et al. 2020). In theory, the more citizens cooperate with the police, the easier policing should become. In the best cases, this may help sustain a mutually beneficial equilibrium in which citizen cooperation improves police effectiveness, effective policing increases citizens' trust, and trusting citizens cooperate more consistently with the police (Tankebe 2009).

But this equilibrium often fails to materialize, as citizens resist cooperating with the police for a myriad of complex and interrelated reasons. These include distrust in the police; lack of access to the police; lack of knowledge of the criminal justice system, and of the procedures involved in reporting to the police; concerns about police corruption, abuse,

fairness, and capacity; and social norms that discourage engaging with the police (Blair 2020a). When choosing whether to share information with the police, citizens likely weigh the expected costs against the expected benefits (Blair, Karim and Morse 2019). In environments characterized by high corruption, low capacity, or predatory police behavior, citizens may simply calculate that the costs exceed the benefits. As a result, fewer crimes are reported, fewer tips are offered, and police officers lose access to an essential source of information. This, in turn, may result in less effective policing and higher levels of crime—which, in turn, may reinforce perceptions of police incompetence.

These dynamics are likely to be especially severe in authoritarian regimes, where the police are often (rightly) perceived as instruments of the ruling party. Even authoritarian governments rely on feedback from citizens to promote social welfare, provide public goods, and ensure regime stability (Tsai 2003). But citizens who do not identify with the ruling party may be especially reluctant to engage with the police, and may in some cases actively withhold information that they believe will be used against them and their communities. Of course, even in authoritarian settings, not all rank-and-file police officers are loyalists of the regime, and many are at least nominally committed to providing security irrespective of citizens' partisan affiliations. But the reputation of the police force as a whole may spill over onto the reputations of individual officers, diminishing citizen cooperation and hindering police effectiveness.

1.2 Community policing

The goal of community policing is to break this cycle by reducing the costs and increasing the benefits of citizen cooperation (Greene and Mastrofski 1988). Broadly speaking, COP aims to improve communication between civilians and police officers, enhance collaboration between communities and the police, and involve citizens more directly in the process of maintaining safety and security in their communities. While the specific components of COP vary across settings, these programs typically involve creating opportunities for dialogue between civil-

ians and police officers (e.g. through town hall meetings), increasing the frequency of police presence at the beat or neighborhood level (e.g. through foot patrols), and enlisting citizens to help monitor and report incidents of crime and insecurity (e.g. through the formation of neighborhood watch teams).

COP is believed to reduce the costs and increase the benefits of citizen cooperation through multiple interrelated mechanisms. Costs are reduced by increasing citizens' access to the police, improving their understanding of police procedures and responsibilities (e.g. through information provided during town hall meetings), and mitigating their concerns about corruption and abuse. Perceived benefits are increased by enhancing citizens' trust in the police (e.g. through interpersonal interaction during foot patrols) and shifting their perceptions of police fairness, impartiality, and capacity. Community policing may also change the behavior of police officers themselves, who may become more empathetic, or may develop a greater sense of accountability towards the citizens they serve. To the extent that community policing moves communities towards this more positive equilibrium, citizens may come to value the presence of the police and develop a preference for greater government spending on policing. Finally, community policing may have a direct deterrent effect on crime as a function of greater police presence and community engagement.

Especially in developing countries, police forces do not operate in isolation from other local actors. Where the police face capacity constraints, other local authorities often play an important role in facilitating police work. In Uganda, each village local council (LC1) has a chairperson who regularly convenes community meetings and serves as liaison between the community and the police. LC1 chairpersons also head the Local Council Court (LCC), a village court that is responsible for adjudicating certain civil matters. Even though local authorities of this kind often play an active role in dispute resolution, they typically do not have jurisdiction over criminal complaints and are required to refer such cases to the police. To the extent that local authorities are involved in the implementation of community policing initiatives, COP may encourage victims and witnesses not only to report crimes directly to

the police, but also to make use of local authorities as indirect reporting channels. Moreover, where perceptions of police capacity and responsiveness improve, local authorities themselves may be more inclined to refer criminal cases to the police.

1.3 Hypotheses

Building on the extant literature, we formalize our expectations about the effects of community policing with the following hypotheses.[4] We expect the program to have a:

Security of life and property

  1a. Negative effect on the incidence of crime

  1b. Positive effect on citizen perceptions of safety (personal, land, and possessions)

Citizen perceptions of the police

  2. Positive effect on citizen perceptions of the police

Police perceptions of and behaviors toward citizens

  3a. Positive effect on police empathy, accountability, and perceptions of the seriousness of police misconduct

  3b. Negative effect on police abuse and bribery

Behavioral cooperation of citizens with the police

  4a. Positive effect on citizen reporting of crime victimization

  4b. Positive effect on citizen reporting of crime prevention tips

  4c. Positive effect on citizen reporting of victimization by the police (when such victimization occurs)

Demand for government spending on police

  5. Positive effect on citizen demand for government spending on the police

Reporting to and referral from local authorities

  6a. Positive effect on citizen reporting of crime victimization to local authorities

  6b. Positive effect on local authority referrals of crime victimization to the police

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[4]Being part of EGAP's community policing Metaketa program, many of this study's hypotheses as well as measurement and estimation strategies were developed in coordination with five other studies. By contrast, as mentioned, the design of the COP program itself was homegrown, with the explicit intention to maximize effectiveness given local conditions.

2 Crime and policing in Uganda

Uganda is an instructive setting for studying the effects of community policing in an authoritarian setting. Uganda is in the mid-range of the World Bank's ranking of low-income countries in terms of economic development (as captured by GDP per capita) and human development (as captured by HDI). In addition, while baseline levels of trust in the UPF leave much room for improvement, they are close to the average among African countries, as Figure 1 shows, and they are not so low as to make COP futile. These parallels suggest that lessons learned in Uganda may be applicable to other African countries, and potentially to other low-income countries as well.

According to the UPF's 2018 Annual Crime Report, the most common crime in Uganda in the year we launched our study was theft (61,533 reported cases), followed by assault (36,323 cases), sex-related crimes (17,521 cases), economic crimes (15,099 cases)—including public and private sector fraud and other white collar crimes—and child-related crimes (11,589 cases), especially child neglect. Aggregating across all categories, the crime rate in Uganda (59 reported crimes per 100,000 inhabitants) is similar to Tanzania (59) and Kenya (62), and somewhat lower than South Africa (77).[5] The distribution of crime by category in the 288 villages in our sample is similar to the distribution nationwide. A majority of our baseline survey respondents (65.1%) had witnessed or heard about at least one crime in their village in the past six months, and in all 288 villages there was at least one respondent who had witnessed or heard about at least one crime in the past six months, with an average of 4.1 reports per village.

Uganda is a low-income country with a per capita GDP of less than $700 USD, and the UPF operates under tight resource constraints. Outside Kampala, the capital and largest city of Uganda where UPF headquarters is located, the force is divided into regional and district units. Each district has a central police station that provides supervision and enhanced

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[5]For global crime rate statistics, see https://bit.ly/3eCIc8X.

Figure 1: Trust in the police across Africa. Nationally representative samples in 34 African countries were asked "How much do you trust the police?" Responses were recoded on a four point scale: 0 "Not at all;" 1 "Just a little;" 2 "Somewhat;" and 3 "A lot." Data source: AfroBarometer (merged) round 7.

capacity to sub-district police stations and posts (i.e. beats). While beat-level officers can investigate misdemeanors, only stations have the expertise to investigate more serious felonies such as rape, assault, armed robbery, and murder. Results from our baseline survey of police officers, summarized in Table 1, show that the average station in our study area supervises 1.3 posts (with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 8), and covers about 39 villages. The average number of officers deployed to stations and posts is 5 and 3, respectively. Only 10% of stations receive a monthly fuel allowance; none of the posts do. The average station in

	Police Stations ($N = 31$)			Police Posts ($N = 41$)		
	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max
Number of officers	5.5	2	26	3.3	2	13
Number of motor cycles	1.1	0	2	0.5	0	1
Receive monthly fuel allowance	10%	-	-	0%	-	-
Crime registration book available	55%	-	-	29%	-	-
Station diary in good condition	90%	-	-	78%	-	-

Table 1: Resources available at police stations and posts in study sample at baseline

our sample has 1 motorbike; the average post has 0.5. None of the police units in our study areas has a functioning computer.

2.1 Police-community relations and COP in Uganda

Police-community relations in Uganda have long been strained by political bias and excessive use of force against civilians. While Uganda holds periodic elections, their credibility has deteriorated over time.[6] Since 1986, the country has been ruled by the same party (the National Resistance Movement, or NRM) and president (Yoweri Museveni). While the NRM undoubtedly enjoys pockets of popular support, to retain power it resorts to manipulation of state resources, intimidation by security forces, and politicized prosecutions of opposition leaders. The UPF thus serves a dual purpose (Curtice and Berhlendorf 2020): on the one hand, like any police force, it is responsible for protecting the life and property of Ugandan citizens, and for maintaining security and enforcing the laws (The Police Act 1994, Article 4). On the other hand, it has also been tasked with quelling dissent and intimidating the political opposition—especially during election periods—in the service of Museveni and the NRM (Kagoro 2015). The UPF also engages in more routine acts of malfeasance. In our baseline survey, 57% of respondents agreed with the statement that the police are corrupt and are primarily interested in pursuing their "personal interests" rather than serving their communities.

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[6]In 2019, Freedom House dropped Uganda's status from Partly Free to Not Free; see https://bit.ly/3fzCnu3.

Against this backdrop of strained police-community relations, community policing was first introduced in Uganda in 1989, with the Kampala Police Station designated as a pilot site. The UPF ostensibly expanded community policing throughout the country in 1993, but did not introduce any formal mechanisms to ensure nationwide implementation, and take-up was inconsistent. While the UPF drafted a community policing manual in 2011, it was not widely implemented beyond rudimentary training at the district level. In a qualitative evaluation conducted in 2013, Irish Aid concluded that "while there is strong political will and leadership by the Inspector General to implement community policing across the [UPF], the UPF has yet to develop a roll-out plan, a re-training program, and a means of monitoring implementation" (Carton et al. 2013, 4). A 2017 UPF report entitled "Strategy for Community Policing" similarly laments that the principles of community policing have yet to be translated into practice.

Nonetheless, interest in community policing remains high within the UPF and among other government stakeholders, especially the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and the Ministry of Justice. President Museveni reaffirmed the country's commitment to COP at the UPF's centenary celebrations in October 2014, following implementation of a more structured community policing pilot project in the Muyenga suburb of Kampala beginning in 2010. The "Muyenga model" was subsequently expanded to cover four additional locations (Jinja, Wakiso, Oyam, and Mubende), and was endorsed by UPF leadership as late as 2017 (Carton et al. 2013). But despite many (anecdotal) accounts of success, in 2018 the Muyenga police station was demolished, and the UPF distanced itself from the project, most likely because of personal confrontations between UPF leadership and Muyenga's local council chairperson.[7]

The visibility of the Muyenga pilot, combined with a 2011 Irish Aid-funded program to support community policing in Uganda, ensured that, at the start of our study, stakeholders in the UPF and the Ugandan government had a relatively clear idea of what COP entails,

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[7]There was a general consensus among our counterparts in Uganda that the closing of the Muyenga police station was not a repudiation of community policing per se, but rather a response to idiosyncratic political confrontations between the chairperson and local police personnel.

and were already largely supportive of it. But dissatisfaction with the Muyenga pilot that surfaced in 2018 also made community policing a somewhat sensitive subject for some high-ranking officials within the UPF hierarchy. This sensitivity, together with leadership rotation, posed a challenge as we managed our relationships with the UPF and our implementing partners. While UPF leadership continued to express enthusiasm for community policing throughout the project, that rhetorical commitment was not always matched by a practical commitment of time or resources to ensure that COP principles were more widely adopted, as we discuss below.

3 Description of the program

The community policing program we study was designed to create opportunities for more positive, mutually respectful interactions between civilians and UPF officers. However, working with a state organ of an authoritarian regime—and especially one that is part of its security apparatus and is associated with human rights violations—naturally raises important ethical concerns. We discuss these concerns and how we addressed them in detail in Section B of the appendix.

In early 2018, the UPF formed a working group to determine what a community policing intervention should entail given the UPF's organizational structure and budget constraints. The working group comprised senior UPF officers and representatives of YIDO, a civil society organization connected to the UPF. The working group's efforts resulted in a detailed COP manual specifying requirements and standard operating procedures for community policing (e.g. how many town hall meetings should be held through each police station, who should attend, what topics should be discussed, how community watch teams should be formed, who should serve on them, etc.). The manual was explicitly designed to be realistic, scalable, and sustainable, such that officers would be more likely to comply with it.

Compared with earlier community policing initiatives, the program we evaluate was not only more structured, but also more closely tailored to the capacities of the UPF. The components of Uganda's COP program were thus "homegrown" in the sense that they were the product of a working group composed of UPF officers and local NGO representatives. Given police autonomy, the research team played no role in writing the standard operating procedures, which reflect what dedicated Ugandans officers and civil society groups believed to be most effective. The research team also made no in-cash or in-kind contributions to the UPF: unlike many field experiments in developing countries, the intervention was self-funded by the UPF, the implementing organization.

YIDO conducted a series of 2-day training sessions for all participating UPF officers to introduce the new COP model and ensure standardized implementation across study sites. Officers were asked to participate in the training as part of their routine activities, and therefore were not compensated in cash or kind. Participating UPF officers did, however, receive certificates of completion. The program consisted of three core components:

1. Town hall meetings. The purpose of town hall meetings was to establish more constant police presence in communities; educate citizens about police roles, responsibilities, obligations, and constraints; build rapport between citizens and the UPF; create opportunities for citizens to ask questions and get immediate responses from UPF officers; encourage reporting of crimes to the UPF; and brainstorm local solutions to local problems. The target was for town hall meetings to take place once every two months, for a total of 4 meetings per community during the study period.

2. Door-to-door visits. Door-to-door visits were intended to create opportunities for more interpersonal interaction and direct dialogue between citizens and UPF officers than is typically possible in the context of a town hall meeting. The target was for door-to-door visits to take place once a month, for a total of 8 visits per community during the study period.

3. Formation of Community Watch Teams (CWTs). CWTs were tasked with monitoring crime, establishing a more direct line of communication between civilians and the police, and creating a cadre of residents that better understand police procedures and resources. This, in turn, was expected to increase the speed of crime reporting to the UPF, and increase the likelihood that crimes would be reported in the first place. CWTs were also expected to help reduce the UPF's caseload by referring petty crimes and non-violent domestic disputes to the local council (LC), the lowest level of communal government in Uganda. Importantly, CWTs were explicitly forbidden to effect arrests or adjudicate criminal cases on their own.

During both town halls and door-to-door visits, UPF officers were expected to disseminate information about UPF oversight and accountability mechanisms to citizens. The UPF has a Professional Standards Unit (PSU) and a set of formal procedures for reporting abuses committed by UPF officers. While citizens often complain about police misconduct, few are aware of the existence of these mechanisms. To increase oversight and accountability, citizens were provided with contact information for officers at the supervising station and the PSU, instructed on the procedures involved in reporting acts of abuse, and encouraged to use those procedures when such acts occur.

In practice, the most consistent component of the program was the town hall meetings. While the UPF conducted door-to-door visits in some communities, they did so infrequently, and—to the best of our knowledge—typically as a reactive response to criminal complaints, rather than a proactive attempt to build trust with civilians. The town hall meetings also became the primary mechanism for disseminating information about UPF oversight and accountability mechanisms. While CWTs were organized in most communities, anecdotal accounts from our implementing partners suggest that they remained largely dormant. We also provided two additional half-day sessions of training to CWTs in a randomly selected subset of treatment villages. For compactness we do not report the marginal effects of this additional training here, which were almost uniformly null (see Section D.3 of the appendix).

A total of 353 town hall meetings were held as part of the intervention between June 2, 2018 and November 17, 2019. The number of attendees ranged widely, from a low of five to a high of 224. Men tended to outnumber women, with a male-to-female ratio greater than 1 in roughly 75% of all meetings. The LC1 chairperson was present at roughly 93% of all meetings; women's group and youth group representatives were present at 41% and 25% of all meetings, respectively. Importantly, in many cases communities organized meetings to discuss recruitment and standard operating procedures for CWTs even without UPF facilitation. Our best estimate is that police were physically present at roughly two-thirds of all meetings.

Topics of discussion ranged widely as well. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most common topics related to the formation and functioning of CWTs. According to qualitative field reports compiled by our implementing partners, this topic was discussed in over half of all meetings. Other topics were variable and sometimes only indirectly related to issues of conflict, crime, and violence: truancy and the need to educate local youths (discussed in roughly one-third of all meetings); drug and alcohol abuse (roughly one-quarter of all meetings); health and sanitation (roughly one-fifth of all meetings); domestic abuse and sexual and gender-based violence (roughly one-fifth of all meetings); gambling (roughly one-seventh of all meetings); and a variety of other topics from traffic accidents to savings groups to stray dogs.

4 Research design

4.1 Site selection

The UPF purposively selected 13 districts for inclusion in the study: Mbarara, Lira, Mbale, Gulu, Mityana, Kamuli, Jinja, Tororo, Iganga, Kabale, Rakai, Arua, and Ntungamo. The UPF applied two inclusion criteria in selecting these districts: equal representation of Uganda's four regions (north, central, east, and west), and, within each region, relatively high crime

rates, as displayed in Figure 2. Of the 23 highest-crime districts in the country, two were excluded because they were too close to Kampala and thus peri-urban;[8] six were excluded because they were located in regions that were over-represented in the sample;[9] and two were excluded due to high levels of political instability, and correspondingly high military presence.[10] The UPF determined that community policing would not be an appropriate strategy in these districts.

Figure 2: Recorded criminal cases per capita based on UPF's 2015 crime statistics. District population figures are derived from Uganda's 2014 census. Study area districts are in dark blue. Horizontal red lines are the corresponding nationwide per capita means.

We then listed all police stations and posts within each of the 13 districts that the UPF selected. Given the UPF's financial and logistical constraints, we considered it unlikely that community policing would affect any of our outcomes of interest in urban locations; we also expected that UPF officers would be less politicized in rural areas. We therefore

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[8]Luwero and Mpigi.

[9]Masindi, Mubende, Kamwenge (central region), Soroti, Palissa (eastern region), and Amuru (northern region).

[10]Masaka and Kasese.

excluded central police stations (located in district capitals), and stations covering parishes with populations greater than 90,000 (i.e. urban). In addition, we excluded police posts with peculiar jurisdictions: for example, those protecting universities, hospitals, or bus stations. Finally, we excluded posts that had only one officer assigned to them. We then randomly selected one post per station.[11] In places where the station had only one post under its jurisdiction (18 stations), we selected that one; in places where the station had no posts, we selected the station itself (32 stations). The result was a sample of 72 relatively rural, relatively high-crime police posts and stations spanning four regions of the country. For simplicity we refer to these as "police stations" from here on.

For each police station in our sample, we identified four villages for subsequent data collection. While some stations cover multiple parishes, we chose to focus on the parishes in which the 72 stations in our sample are physically located. We did this because we assumed UPF officers would face logistical constraints when traveling to more distant villages, and we wanted to maximize the likelihood of exposure to the intervention among the villages in our sample. We asked the UPF to provide a list of villages (1) located in the same parish as the station and (2) under the jurisdiction of the corresponding station. Within each jurisdiction, we randomly selected four villages from this list. In parishes with fewer than four villages, we selected the closest village from an adjacent parish that still fell under the jurisdiction of the same station.

4.2   Randomization

The unit of randomization was the police station. We block randomized within each of the four regions of Uganda in order to maximize the degree of similarity between treatment and control units.[12] To do this, we used the 2014 census to construct 11 blocking variables at the

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[11]There are 16 stations with 2 posts, 3 stations with 4 posts, and 3 stations with 5 posts.

[12]To ensure balance within regions, we recoded the northernmost station in the eastern region as belonging to the northern region, and the two central-most stations in the western region as belonging to the central region.

station level:[13] population; % male; average age; % literate; average household size; average years of education; average number of meals eaten per day; % involved in an occupation other than subsistence agriculture; a standardized household asset index;[14] a standardized household quality index;[15] and a standardized index of social services available.[16] We also constructed six additional blocking variables capturing the number of posts, parishes, villages, and police officers under the jurisdiction of the station, as well as distance to Kampala and distance to the district capital.[17] We organized stations into blocks of four using the Mahalanobis distance between covariates, then randomly assigned two stations to the treatment group and two to control in each block of four.

4.3 Compliance

We encountered a number of challenges during implementation that may have weakened the impact of the program, and that would likely weaken the impact of any future community policing intervention in Uganda. First, police officers rotate in and out of rural police stations quite frequently. Unfortunately we were unable to (re)train officers on community policing protocols with every one of these rotations. Second, while 92% of all treatment communities held at least one town hall meeting over the course of the intervention, only 69% held two, and only 34% held four or more. The share of treatment communities that reported door-to-door visits was even lower.

Potential sources of treatment non-compliance are myriad, though we believe the crux of the problem lies in the UPF's tight resource constraints: officers in treatment stations were asked by their superiors to exert more effort, with no additional funding. Given that

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[13]Census data was collected at the parish level. We aggregate up to the station level, weighting by parish population (for variables recorded as percentages).

[14]Our standardized household asset index comprises a set of 15 assets, including bicycles, televisions, shoes, and blankets.

[15]Our standardized household quality index is composed of the materials used for the respondent's roof, walls, and floor, as well as the number of rooms in the household, and an indicator for whether the household has a toilet.

[16]Our standardized index of social services includes number of public and private health clinics, number of public and private schools, and an estimate for the distance to the nearest potable water source.

[17]We also used these latter six variables to impute missing values on the former 11 (census-based) variables.

COP was technically already nationwide policy, the tasks required of officers as part of the program fell squarely within the scope of their existing duties. Nonetheless, focus group discussions we conducted prior to the program launch suggest that UPF officers in rural areas only rarely visit the communities under their jurisdictions, and then typically only when crimes are committed.

Given these dynamics, it is perhaps unsurprising that compliance was spotty, even among officers who made a good faith effort to participate. These dynamics were further compounded by principal-agent problems between rank-and-file officers in the field and their superior officers at district or regional headquarters. Without reliable mechanisms for monitoring and sanctioning officers who shirk, those who did not want to make a good faith effort had little reason to do so. These challenges—frequent rotation of police officers, resource constraints, and principal-agent problems—are typical of police forces across the developing world.

Despite these challenges, the program increased the rate of interactions between civilians and the police. Residents of treatment communities were 45% more likely to recall at least one town hall meeting with police officers in their community during the preceding six months, from a base rate of 31% in control villages (Figure 3). They were also 19% more likely to report the existence of an active CWT in their community, and more likely to report observing CWT patrols. However, they were no more likely to report police patrols in their community. This is consistent with data we collected from LC1 chairpersons to monitor treatment compliance while the program was in the field, and with our own (anecdotal) impressions of the program.

Figure 3: Compliance: share of respondents who have heard of a community meeting in the past six months, by treatment group at both baseline (top) and endline (bottom panel).

4.4   Data and outcome measurement

Administrative data

We collected data on our key outcomes of interest from multiple sources. Ultimately, the goal of community policing is to reduce crime and violence and thus improve citizen security.

We measured crime and violence as reported to the police using UPF administrative data.[18] Before the intervention began, we collected baseline data on all crimes reported to all UPF stations in our sample from March 1 to May 27, 2018. These data include the type of crime, the date and location of the crime, the gender of the victim and perpetrator (when available), and the outcome of the resulting case (when available). We collected the same data at endline, after the intervention was complete. These data span the period from July 15, 2019 to January 15, 2020.[19]

Citizen survey

Community policing is also intended to change the attitudes and behaviors of citizens, who may express greater trust in the police, more favorable opinions of the intentions and capacity of the police, and more willingness to cooperate with the police in criminal investigations and other activities. We test for these possibilities using baseline and endline surveys, both of which were conducted in person by local enumerators from the Uganda office of Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA), a research NGO.

The baseline took place between June and July 2018. We randomly selected 12 households in each village in our sample.[20] To ensure gender balance, we sampled six men and six women per village. Given the sensitivity of some of the questions asked about crime victimization, female respondents were interviewed by female enumerators. Households in which the randomly selected respondent was unavailable to be surveyed at any point during the same day were replaced. The result was a stratified random sample of 3,456 respondents. Wherever possible we interviewed the same respondents at endline, replacing them

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[18]Because UPF leadership knew which stations and posts were assigned to treatment and which were assigned to control, it is possible that they could have instructed officers to falsify their records to make it look like crime was decreasing in treatment communities. Given the UPF's resource constraints and its inability to closely monitor the behavior of rural police officers, we view this as extremely unlikely.

[19]Data collection in four police stations took place in December, 2019, covering a period from June 1 to December 1, 2019. Data for all other police stations were collected starting in late January, 2020.

[20]In each community, mobilizers worked with the LC1 and the village health team to create a roster of all households in the community. From this roster, we randomly selected 12 households for surveying, as well as 24 ordered household replacements.

only when they were unavailable or had died or moved away. In total, we replaced 510 out of 3,456 citizen respondents, for an attrition rate of about 15%. As can be seen in Tables SI-14 and SI-15 in the appendix, we find no evidence that our treatment had an effect on rates or patterns of attrition.

Police officer survey

In addition to reducing crime and improving citizens' perceptions of the police, COP aims to inform police officers about citizens' priorities and concerns, and thereby encourage officers to become more empathetic toward the communities they serve. Community policing may also increase officers' sense of accountability to civilians. Ideally these attitudinal changes result in behavioral changes as well, with officers becoming more respectful towards citizens during routine activities.

We measure officers' attitudes and behaviors using baseline and endline surveys of officers deployed to the stations in our sample. The baseline took place between June and July 2018. In each of the 72 police stations and posts, we interviewed the Officer in Charge (O/C) and, whenever possible, the Community Liaison Officer (CLO) and Child and Family Protection Unit (CFPU) officer. Among the more junior officers, we randomly selected as many as needed to reach a quota of 5 respondents per station or post, for a total of 217 officers. We sought to interview the same officers at endline, though by that point many had been reassigned to different locations. Among the 198 officers we interviewed at endline, only 44 were ones we also interviewed at baseline (for an attrition rate of 80%). The rest were randomly selected replacement officers.[21] Again, attrition rates are not a function of treatment assignment (Tables SI-14 and SI-15 in the appendix).

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[21]There are 173 officers who were interviewed at baseline but not endline. It is not the case that all those officers were reaasigned; some were simply not available for interview or not present.

Survey of local authorities

We measure the attitudes of local authorities using a survey with LC1 chairpeople. LC1 chairpeople were only interviewed at endline. We managed to interview the LC1 chairperson in each of our 288 study villages—a response rate of 100%. In some cases, the LC1 chairperson had also been interviewed as part of the citizen survey.

Table C in the appendix provides descriptive statistics of (non-standardized) baseline measures for a subset of our outcomes of interest. We run all analyses on outcome measures that have been standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation at baseline (or by the standard deviation in the control group if no baseline measure is available). To combine outcomes into indices, we first impute missing values in constituent outcomes, separately within treatment and control groups based on a linear model with all other constituent outcomes of the index and block fixed effects as predictors. Then, we take the average of all constituent items. Finally, we standardize the index again. Analyses of separate items rely on listwise deletion.

4.5 Estimation and hypothesis testing

We use the following pre-registered specification to estimate the sample intent-to-treat effect (ITT) of the COP program:

$$\boldsymbol{y} = \alpha + \tau \boldsymbol{z} + \boldsymbol{X}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{\gamma} + \boldsymbol{\epsilon},$$

where τ denotes the sample ITT, $\boldsymbol{z}$ is an indicator for assignment to the COP intervention, $\boldsymbol{X}$ denotes covariates, $\boldsymbol{B}$ denotes block fixed effects, and $\boldsymbol{\epsilon}$ is an individual-level error term. The covariate matrix $\boldsymbol{X}$ includes a baseline measurement of the outcome and an indicator for missing values in the baseline measurement, which have been imputed as zeros.

In some cases, covariates are omitted because no baseline measure of the outcome was collected. Where the outcome is an index, the baseline measure consists of an index of all

constituent items for which baseline measures are available. Analyses that are based on data from surveys with citizens, local authorities, and police officers use respondents as the unit of analysis and allow for clustering of standard errors at the level of police stations. For analyses of administrative data, the unit of analysis is the police station and standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. In keeping with our PAP, we use the Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) correction to adjust the p-values that result from tests of our eleven main hypotheses for multiple comparisons. In the appendix, we present analyses that disaggregate outcome indices into their constituent outcomes (Table SI-3). In these cases we adjust all p-values from hypothesis tests that pertain to constituent items of the same outcome index, focusing again on main hypotheses only.

5 Results

We present our study's main results in Figure 4, and in the appendix in tabular form (Table SI-2).

5.1 Primary outcomes

We find no evidence that the COP program affected most of the outcomes we measured. We do not find evidence that the program reduced the incidence of crime as captured by our survey (H1a). This finding is robust to aggregating multiple types of crime into a single index (as in the figure), to distinguishing between violent and non-violent crime, and to disaggregating crime by type (as in Table SI-3). This conclusion also holds for property destruction and violent disputes over land use or boundaries. Unlike crime incidence, the program appears to have increased the number of crimes recorded by the UPF, though we believe this is most appropriately interpreted as an increase in crime reporting rather than an increase in crime incidence, for reasons we discuss below.

Given that the program had no discernible effect on crime incidence—an objective

indicator of personal safety—it is perhaps unsurprising that we find no evidence that the program improved subjective perceptions of personal safety either (H1b). This result again holds for the index, and for all components of the index (Figure 4 as well as Tables SI-2 and SI-3 in the appendix). Nor do we find evidence that the program improved perceptions of the police (H2). Residents of treatment communities were no more likely to trust the police, no more likely to express satisfaction with the services the police provide, and no less likely to feel intimidated by police presence in their community (Table SI-3).

We similarly do not find evidence that the program improved empathy, accountability, or perceptions of the seriousness of police misconduct among police officers themselves (H3a). Indeed, if anything police officers in treatment stations expressed a diminished sense of their own accountability: the coefficients on the index and its component parts are almost uniformly negative, and in some cases they are nearly statistically significant at conventional levels. This is especially true for index components related to corruption and accountability. Perhaps relatedly, there is some suggestive evidence that the program increased the incidence of police abuse (H3b), a result driven by a small increase in the reported frequency with which respondents made unofficial payments to the police. We discuss this finding in further detail below.

We find no evidence that the program increased crime reporting among victims and witnesses as measured in our survey (H4a). Interpretation of this result is somewhat ambiguous, however, since some index items conflate respondents who were not victims of crime with those who were victims but chose not to report to the police. (Both are coded as 0s in order to avoid post-treatment bias.) We also do not find evidence of a treatment effect on constituent items that ask respondents whether they would prefer the police to respond to hypothetical criminal cases. We find no evidence that the program increased direct reporting of crime prevention tips ether (H4b).

Interestingly, we do find some suggestive evidence that residents of treatment communities reported more tips indirectly, for example by reporting to the LC1 in the expectation

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that tips would be referred to the police (see outcomes "Share info indirectly" and "Assist investigation indirectly" in Table SI-3 in the appendix). However, we do not find any evidence that the program increased the perception among local authorities that citizens would report crimes to them (H6a). Neither does the program appear to affect the willingness of local authorities to refer cases to the police (H6b). However, our estimates are suggestive of increased reporting of police misconduct to the UPF (H4c), a result driven in particular by an increase in reports of misconduct in the UPF's own records. In line with the other results, we do not find evidence of an increase in citizens' demand for government spending on policing (H5).

Figure 4: Estimated Effects of Community Policing

Estimated treatment effect with 95% confidence intervals

Letters in parentheses denote the source of outcome and covariate data. *C* stands for surveys with citizens; *A* for administrative crime records obtained from police stations; *O* for surveys with police officers; and *L* for surveys with local authorities. *p*-values for analyses involving main survey outcomes are adjusted using the pre-registered Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) adjustment.

5.2 Mechanism outcomes

Figure 4 also reports results for pre-registered hypothesized mechanisms. Consistent with our finding that the COP program did not increase citizens' trust in or satisfaction with the police, we also do not find evidence that the program improved beliefs about police intentions. The program does, however, seem to have enhanced citizens' knowledge of the criminal justice system. This result is driven in particular by an apparent improvement in citizens' understanding of the rules and procedures involved with reporting crimes to the police (appendix, Table SI-3). Residents of treatment communities were more likely to know the police are not required to investigate witnesses as suspects, more likely to know the police are not allowed to charge fees to register cases, and more likely to know the police will record criminal complaints even if they are reported by phone (rather than in person). Increased knowledge of the criminal justice system may have facilitated crime reporting, as we discuss in Section 6. Importantly, the positive treatment effect on knowledge cannot be attributed to social desirability bias: either respondents knew the correct answers to the questions we asked them, or they did not.

In addition, we do not find that the program strengthened norms of citizen cooperation with the police: residents of treatment communities were (marginally) more likely to anticipate social sanctions for reporting burglaries to the police, and (also marginally) less likely to believe victims or bystanders will report armed robberies (appendix, Table SI-3), but the treatment effect estimate for the index is small and statistically insignificant. We also find no evidence that the program improved beliefs about police capacity, or police responsiveness to citizen feedback. Finally, we find no evidence that the program increased trust in the courts.[22] This is unsurprising given our finding that the program did not increase trust in the police.

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[22]Unfortunately, we were unable to ask respondents about trust in the government since the UPF deemed these questions too politically sensitive.

5.3 Heterogeneous treatment effects

Tables SI-4 through SI-9 in the appendix report heterogeneous treatment effects (HTEs) of the COP program by gender, NRM support, feelings of intimidation by the police at baseline, and expressed satisfaction with the police at baseline, and by whether respondents scored higher or lower than the median value on each of our dependent variables at baseline. We also report HTEs by whether or not respondents live in a parish that is an NRM stronghold based on results from the 2016 general elections.

With a few exceptions, we do not find evidence of treatment effect heterogeneity along these dimensions. The positive effect on crime reporting does appear smaller among respondents who reported feeling intimidated at baseline, and (weakly) larger among respondents who expressed satisfaction with the police. The positive effect on reporting of police abuse also seems (weakly) smaller among respondents who felt intimidated at baseline. Our estimates suggest that the positive effect on knowledge of the criminal justice system is smaller among NRM supporters. The effect on crime victimization also seems to be more negative among NRM supporters than among NRM opponents. We are careful not to over-interpret these results, since most of our estimates of treatment effect heterogeneity remain statistically insignificant. With this caveat, if anything, our results suggest that the COP program was somewhat less effective among those who we hoped would benefit from it the most: opponents of the ruling party and respondents who were intimidated by and dissatisfied with the UPF at baseline.

6   Discussion

We do not find evidence that the COP program in Uganda affected most of our hypothesized outcomes. Our results do, however, leave us with some puzzles to explore. First, while we find no evidence that the program reduced either crime or crime reporting as measured in our survey, we do find suggestive evidence that it increased crime as captured in UPF records

(Figure 4). This result is unlikely to be an artifact of outliers: treatment effect estimates change little when the most outlying observations are excluded from the analysis. Nor is it likely to be an artifact of better record keeping in treatment police stations: we find no evidence that treatment stations were more likely to maintain a crime log, or that they kept their crime logs in better condition than control group stations. The effect does not appear to be an artifact of seasonality either, as it holds even when we exclude stations that were visited first.[23]

How to explain this discrepancy between the survey and the UPF crime data? One possibility is that the discrepancy is due to sampling variability. Another possibility is that the positive treatment effect on crime in the UPF data is due to an increase in crime reporting, rather than an increase in crime itself. Most crimes in Uganda are never reported to the police, especially in rural areas. In our baseline survey, for example, only 26% of respondents who indicated that their household had been the victim of a burglary over the past 6 months said that they reported the burglary to the police. Since we observe no corresponding increase in crime in the survey data, and no decrease in perceptions of personal safety, we interpret the increase in the UPF data as suggestive evidence that residents of treatment communities may have been more likely to report crimes to the police.

While we do not observe a corresponding increase in crime reporting in the survey, interpretation of this result is ambiguous, since we do not separate respondents who did not report crimes from those who were not victims of crime in the first place. And while we find no evidence of a change in norms of citizen cooperation with the police, it is possible that residents of treatment communities became more willing to report despite heightened concerns about social sanctions. Indeed, in an experimental evaluation of a similar intervention in Liberia, Blair, Karim and Morse (2019) find that residents of treatment communities reported crimes at higher rates despite being more rather than less fearful of social sanctions

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[23]Since endline data collection took place over a relatively protracted period, crime rates, and correspondingly crime reporting, could have been affected by the specific date that administrative data was collected from a given police station.

from their neighbors for engaging with the police. Our results are consistent with these findings.

This apparent increase in crime reporting is somewhat puzzling, given that we find no evidence of treatment effects on trust in the police or perceptions of police intentions and capacity. Criminologists have long argued that citizens will only report crimes to the police if they perceive the police as "procedurally legitimate," meaning that they trust the police to treat them fairly and respectfully when they report (Tyler and Huo 2002). This implies that if we observe an increase in crime reporting, then we should also observe an increase in trust in the police. But we do not.

One potential solution to this puzzle lies in the program's positive effect on citizens' rate of interaction with police officers and their knowledge of the criminal justice system. As discussed in Section 5, residents of treatment communities expressed greater understanding of the rules and procedures associated with reporting crimes to the police. Misunderstanding of these rules and procedures can be an obstacle to reporting, for example if victims believe they will have to pay a fee to file a criminal complaint, or if witnesses believe they will be investigated as suspects if they share information with the police. The program may have increased reporting in part by correcting these misunderstandings. In addition, more frequent interaction with police officers may have reduced at least some of the costs associated with reporting.

Consistent with this interpretation, we find that crime reporting in the UPF data is positively correlated with knowledge of the criminal justice system in the survey, and that changes in crime reporting are positively correlated with changes in knowledge as well, at least in the treatment group. These results are descriptive and correlational, but they nonetheless lend some credence to our intuition that crime reporting is increasing with knowledge of the criminal justice system.

Perhaps our most unexpected finding is that the COP program in Uganda increased unofficial payments to the police. As discussed above, 9.8% of respondents in treatment

villages reported having made an informal payment to UPF officers in the past six months, compared to 7.3% of respondents in control villages. This raises the possibility that Uganda's COP program had the adverse unintended consequence of exacerbating petty corruption. (We note, however, that the statistical significance of this result does not survive a multiple comparisons correction.)

One potential explanation for this finding (assuming it is not simply a type-I error) lies in the increased frequency of interactions between civilians and police officers that occurred as a result of the intervention. Some of these interactions were a direct, even mechanical effect of the intervention itself, which induced contact between civilians and the police in the context of town hall meetings. Other interactions may have occurred as an indirect result of the program. For example, if residents of treatment communities were more likely to report crimes to the police, then they were (presumably) also more likely to interact with whichever officers responded to their complaints. Increased interactions between civilians and the police may have created opportunities for bribe-seeking that would not have arisen in the absence of the program.

But there are other plausible (and less nefarious) explanations as well. Ugandan police officers operate under severe resource constraints, creating a pervasive culture of "fees for service" for investigating criminal complaints. These are not necessarily obscene requests: in order to facilitate investigations and other activities, UPF officers are known to ask citizens to buy fuel, stationary, and other necessities, without which they would be incapable of doing their jobs. The combination of increased knowledge, increased crime reporting, and increased unofficial payments suggests the possibility that officers continued to solicit fees for service as before, but that residents of treatment villages were more likely to view these fees as "unofficial payments." In other words, the intervention may have failed to eliminate fees for service (much less the conditions that make those fees necessary), at the same time that it taught citizens to recognize that such payments are unofficial—i.e. not sanctioned by official police policy.

The increase in unofficial payments may, in turn, help explain why COP did not improve perceptions of the police: if community policing increased the frequency of interactions between civilians and the UPF, but UPF officers used those interactions to solicit unofficial payments, then it is perhaps unsurprising that perceptions did not improve. But again, this is only one potential explanation for the program's null effects on perceptions and other outcomes. Another possible explanation lies in the frequent rotation of police officers into and out of treatment stations. Of the 72 stations in our sample, more than half (38) experienced a 100% respondent turnover rate between baseline and endline—meaning that none of the officers surveyed at baseline were still assigned to the station at endline—and most witnessed at least some respondent turnover. (Note, however, that we did not survey all officers at each station at baseline. So a 100% turnover rate among our respondents may not indicate a 100% turnover rate among all officers at the station.) It is possible that lessons from the COP training that all treatment group officers received at the start of the program were not transmitted as officers rotated in and out. It is also possible that frequent rotation prevented officers from establishing a rapport with citizens.

Another potential explanation lies in low treatment compliance. According to monitoring data that we collected over the course of the intervention, 132 of the 144 villages assigned to treatment reported at least one town hall meeting between civilians and the police. But only 99 villages reported two meetings, only 69 reported three meetings, and only 49 reported four or more. While this degree of saturation was sufficient to generate statistically significant treatment effects on our index of compliance, it may not have been enough to change attitudes or behaviors, especially over such a long period of time. Compliance with the other components of the program was even lower: only 23 villages reported a door-to-door visit, and none reported more than one. Only 13 villages reported a nighttime patrol, and only one reported more than one. Again, this may not have been enough to change residents' minds about the police.

Given the structure of the program, it is perhaps unsurprising that treatment com-

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pliance was low. The UPF demanded that officers in program areas expend extra effort traveling to villages and meeting with civilians, but provided no additional resources to offset the financial and opportunity costs that officers incurred in the process. Moreover, qualitative data we collected clearly suggests that UPF leadership generally did not sanction officers who were shirking. Finally, the weak or null effects of the intervention on crime and perceptions of the police may also be a result of the relatively long lag between the intervention, which ended between March and June 2019 (depending on the community), and the endline survey, which began in December 2019 and continued until February 2020.[24] It is possible that the intervention had beneficial effects on some outcomes in the short term, which decayed over time.

7   Conclusion

Community policing has been shown to be an effective model for improving strained relations and building trust and cooperation between citizens and the police. However, much of the existing evidence is from a small number of rich industrialized democracies. Using the case of Uganda, we study the effects of a homegrown community policing program in a low-income country setting, where the police report directly to an authoritarian regime. The program we study was designed and implemented by the UPF in close collaboration with local civil society groups, and was endorsed by a number of powerful actors and agencies within the government.

Notwithstanding local ownership and buy-in from both high-ranking government officials and UPF officers, we find no evidence that the program achieved many of its goals. While we do find that the program increased citizen knowledge of the law and police procedures, and may have also increased crime reporting, the program did not improve citizens' perceptions of the police, did not reduce crime, and did not increase citizens' sense of secu-

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[24]Acquiring government approval to conduct research on public opinion of policing in Uganda is a slow and arduous process, and our endline was delayed by several months as a result.

rity. Importantly, citizens who expressed fear and dissatisfaction with the UPF at baseline did not benefit more from the program, and may have benefited less; the same is true for opponents of the ruling party.

Above we discuss several possible explanations for these disappointing results, including high officer turnover and lax top-down monitoring, which itself led to weak incentives for overworked rank-and-file officers who were asked to "do more" but were not compensated by UPF for their additional efforts. Indeed, it is possible that the treatment itself—again, designed by the UPF—was too weak to increase trust in an institution that has long been perceived as untrustworthy.

Of course, even if the treatment had been much stronger and treatment compliance much higher, there is no guarantee that COP would have changed citizens' attitudes or behaviors in a beneficial (or even discernible) way, especially if officers used interactions with citizens as opportunities to solicit unofficial payments. This underscores the importance of careful monitoring and robust incentives and sanctions to maximize compliance and minimize the risk of misconduct. Absent these mechanisms, community policing may only reinforce existing (strained) police-community relations. That said, it is also quite possible that the ability of police forces to maximize compliance is endogenous to initial conditions, including an overly close association with a non-democratic regime. A better understanding of how COP program design is affected by the political status quo is therefore an important avenue for future research.

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— Supporting Information for "Can Community Policing Improve
Police-Community Relations in an Authoritarian Regime?" —

A Research Design: Additional Information

Spillover

Our research design assumes the absence of spillover from treatment to control communities. Criminologists typically distinguish between two types of spillover in the study of policing: displacement and diffusion. Displacement occurs when increased police presence in one location induces (potential) criminals to commit crimes in another location instead. Diffusion occurs when increased police presence in one location deters (potential) criminals in other locations as well.[25] Recent research suggests that diffusion is more common than displacement (Bowers et al. 2011; Guerette and Bowers 2009), though this is still a matter of debate (Getmanski, Grossman and Wright 2019; Chalfin and McCrary 2017).

Spillover would bias our treatment effect estimates. Fortunately, there are reasons to believe this problem is likely to be relatively minor in our case. Because we randomized at the post (or station) level, and because most posts have jurisdiction over an entire parish (or, in the case of stations, an entire sub-county), treatment and control communities are almost always located in different parishes. Indeed, in seven of the 12 districts in our study, all sample villages in the district are assigned either to treatment or to control.

Even in the remaining districts, our sample consists of police stations, posts, and villages that are generally quite far apart from one another. On average, stations in our sample are located approximately 14 km from one another. More to the point, the average distance between control stations and the nearest treatment station in our sample is 16 km.

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[25]Diffusion of other outcomes is of course possible as well. For example, residents of a treatment community could share their increased knowledge of the criminal justice system with residents of control communities.

(The shortest distance is 0.82 km.) The villages in our sample are located 1.5 km apart on average, and the average distance between control villages and the nearest treatment village is 14.2 km. (The shortest distance is 1.2 km.) 97% of treatment police stations are located at least 1 km from the nearest control station, 94% are located at least 2 km away, and 89% are located at least 3 km away. Similarly, 100% of treatment villages are located at least 1 km from the nearest control village, 93% are located at least 2 km away, and 87% are located at least 3 km away. These are long distances in rural Uganda, where roads are rough and few citizens have access to a vehicle. This should reduce the risk of bias from spillover effects.

Monitoring data

We used several mechanisms to monitor treatment compliance throughout implementation of the COP program. To monitor town hall meetings, we provided UPF officers at each post with a schedule to record the date and location of each meeting, as well as contact information for the LC1 chairperson and any other individual(s) responsible for mobilizing residents to attend the meetings. We also sent a staff member from IPA Uganda to attend all meetings and take detailed notes, including the date, time, and location of the meeting, the number of attendees, the topics discussed, and any questions asked and answers given. After each meeting, we asked officers to complete a separate form with the same information for purposes of validation, though compliance with this latter monitoring mechanism was low.

To monitor the activity of the CWTs, we provided them with a form that they were expected to complete and return to YIDO at the end of each month. The form included details on any incidents to which the CWT responded in the previous month, including whether or not the incident was reported to the police, whether or not the police responded, how long it took the police to respond, whether an arrest was made, and how satisfied the victim was with the police's response. Compliance with this latter monitoring mechanism

was low. We also collected data on the names, age, and gender of all CWT members, as well as contact information for the leaders of each CWT.

B   Ethics

We were interested in studying the COP program in Uganda because we believed it had the potential to improve police-community relations in a country where those relations have long been strained. Ugandan citizens of all political stripes are susceptible to crime and insecurity—problems that the UPF is constitutionally mandated to address. Given the impressive track record of community policing in the Global North, even in countries and communities with adversarial police-community relations, we (as well as many other local stakeholders) believed there were significant potential benefits for citizen wellbeing (in terms of crime reduction and enhanced personal security) to a program of the sort we evaluate here.

However, given the nature of the regime in Uganda and the role the UPF plays in entrenching it, the study raises important ethical concerns that we address in this section. As guiding principles, we went beyond the IRB requirements of the various organizations that reviewed and approved our study, and we consulted the APSA Council's Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research.[26] We note that IRB approvals were obtained not only from our respective universities, but also from a local NGO (Mildmay Uganda Research Ethics Committee), Uganda's National Council for Science and Technology, Uganda's Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Office of the President.

We took a number of precautions to mitigate any potential risks associated with the program and our evaluation of it. As discussed in the paper, despite the UPF's national reputation as an instrument of the ruling NRM party, rank-and-file officers at the local level tend to be less politicized, especially in the years between elections. For this reason, we encouraged UPF not to conduct the study in an election year. (Implementation indeed

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[26]APSA's guidelines can be found online at https://bit.ly/31VEVgK.

occurred in 2018-2019, between the 2016 and 2021 general elections). Moreover, given that politicization is also much less of a problem in rural areas than in urban centers, where clashes between security forces and the political opposition tend to be most common, we recommended that UPF limit the scope of the study to rural regions. (The sampling frame indeed excluded urban areas.)

The intervention involved increased police presence in and around Ugandan communities. This had important ethical implications in a setting in which the police have a reputation for petty corruption and bribe-seeking. Indeed, one goal of the intervention was to foster greater empathy and understanding between civilians and police officers, which we hoped would mitigate the incidence of corruption and abuse. To guard against the risk that increased contact would exacerbate misconduct, we developed a robust monitoring and reporting system, described in detail above, which allowed us to observe many (though admittedly not all) of the interactions between civilians and police officers that occurred in the context of the intervention. (It is possible, however, that more routine "fee for service" requests and other forms of petty corruption may have occurred without our monitors noticing.)

The Ugandan police is known to deploy specialized (quasi-militarized) units, for example to quell opposition rallies and protest marches. These militarized units operate under a different organizational hierarchy and command structure, reporting directly to the Inspector General of the Police and, through him, the president. The mandate of these national forces is to "prevent disorder," not to solve crime. Importantly, we excluded these specialized units from our study, which focused on local police beats and stations. As mentioned above, these beats and stations are part of a different organizational structure and have a separate mandate: crime prevention and investigation. Whether citizens can separate their attitudes towards the national (quasi-militarized) police from their attitudes towards the local police (and build greater trust with the latter) was not apparent at the study's onset, but is of utmost importance for both theory and policy.

The intervention also involved strengthening the role that CWTs play in providing security for their communities. This component of the program had important ethical implications as well, especially if CWTs became embroiled in political intimidation or vigilantism. In their efforts to organize CWTs, YIDO and UPF repeatedly emphasized that CWTs have no legal authority to arrest, adjudicate crimes, or otherwise act as substitutes for the police. YIDO and the UPF also explicitly distinguished CWTs from "Crime Preventers"—an earlier community-based security program with ties to the NRM—and framed the CWT initiative as an attempt to strengthen police-community partnerships while avoiding the adverse unintended consequences of the Crime Preventers program.

APSA's Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research also discuss deception (principal 6) and consent (principal 5). Attendance at town hall meetings and other community policing activities was voluntary, and involved no deception. It would have been infeasible to tell people who participated in these activities that they were part of a study, as this would have made the entire intervention unrealistic, would have generated severe experimenter demand effects, and would have alienated both the UPF officers and the LC1 chairpeople who were the de facto organizers of these activities. It is also worth noting that the villagers who participated in our research activities (e.g. surveys) were not necessarily the same as those who participated in the community policing activities. We were interested in measuring possible treatment effects on villages as a whole, not specifically on those who participated in community policing activities. Hence, our sampling frame included all residents of each treatment and control community, whether or not they attended the town hall meetings or otherwise participated in the COP program. Written voluntary informed consent was sought and documented for all research activities.

Finally, APSA's Principal 10 asks that political science researchers consider the broader impact of their studies on local political processes. One might be concerned that if community policing improves police-community relations, this might translate into greater support for the incumbent NRM regime. We stress again that the COP program we study was de-

signed and executed by the police as part of their routine activities, and that the research team had no control over the UPF's decision to implement the program. UPF leadership has long expressed a commitment to COP principles, and the intervention we evaluate was part of a progression of increasingly ambitious COP initiatives in Uganda. Relatedly, the research team made no direct contribution in-cash or in-kind to the UPF, which self-funded all implementation activities.

C   Descriptive statistics

Table C reports descriptive statistics from our baseline survey.

Table SI-1:
Baseline Summary

Outcome Family	Outcome	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Compliance (C)	Foot patrol frequency	1.39	0.97	1	5	3444
	Community meeting awareness	0.30	0.46	0	1	3440
	Active neighborhood watch team	0.15	0.35	0	1	3384
Crime victimization (C)	Violent crimes (personal)	0.15	1.03	0	50	3456
	Non-violent crimes (personal)	0.50	2.03	0	70	3456
Crime victimization (A)	Violent crimes	52.06	51.59	1	349	72
	Non-violent crimes	93.56	77.28	6	364	72
Perceived future insecurity (C)	Feared violent crime	0.76	1.03	0	3	3380
	Fear non-violent crime	0.80	1.01	0	3	3373
	Feared walking	1.02	1.32	0	4	3451
Overall perceptions of police (C)	Trust in police	2.38	1.38	0	4	3432
	Trust in service of police	2.30	1.32	0	4	3432
	Not intimidated police	1.23	0.92	0	2	3453
Police empathy and accountability (O)	Police takes complaints seriously	2.71	0.63	0	3	217
	Empathy (complaints)	1.77	1.06	0	3	217
	Empathy (reports)	2.56	0.72	0	3	217
Experience of police abuse (C)	Police abuse	0.08	0.28	0	1	3448
	Bribe frequency	1.13	0.43	1	4	3452
	Bribe amount (USD)	1.97	13.32	0	458	3454
Crime reporting (C)	Violent crimes reported (personal)	0.04	0.19	0	2	3456
	Non-violent crimes reported (personal)	0.06	0.23	0	2	3456
	Burglary resolution	0.63	0.48	0	1	3456
	Domestic abuse resolution	0.33	0.47	0	1	3456
	Armed robbery resolution	0.86	0.34	0	1	3456
Crime tips (C)	Contacted police for suspicious activity	0.15	0.36	0	1	3452
	Gave information to police	0.13	0.34	0	1	3452
Police abuse reporting (C)	Reported drinking on duty	2.18	1.15	1	4	3430
	Reported police beating	2.66	1.09	1	4	3437
	Reported police abuse	0.02	0.14	0	1	3447
Perceived police intentions (C)	Police are not corrupt	1.52	1.50	0	4	3406
	Police serve equally	2.14	1.39	0	4	3414
	Police will investigate	2.97	1.04	0	4	3428
	Police will be fair	1.89	1.29	0	4	3399
Knowledge of criminal justice (C)	Legal Knowledge (suspect)	0.45	0.50	0	1	3312
	Legal Knowledge (lawyer)	0.68	0.47	0	1	2865

	Legal Knowledge (fees)	0.70	0.46	0	1	3277
	Legal Knowledge (domestic abuse)	0.86	0.35	0	1	3442
	Legal knowledge (drop case)	0.17	0.38	0	1	3382
	Police Knowledge (followup)	0.23	0.42	0	1	3276
	Police Knowledge (where is station)	0.98	0.15	0	1	3456
	Police knowledge (phone number)	0.21	0.41	0	1	3456
Norms of cooperation with police (C)	Reporting norm (theft)	3.08	1.10	0	4	3449
	Reporting norm (domestic abuse)	2.65	1.27	0	4	3446
	Obey police norm	1.43	1.36	0	4	3435
Perceived police capacity (C)	Police timeliness	2.33	1.33	0	4	3356
	Police investigation capacity	2.56	1.24	0	4	3399
Perceived police responsiveness (C)	Police responsive to complaints	2.50	1.32	0	4	3420
	Police consider opinions	3.07	1.36	1	5	3408

Letters in parentheses denote the data source. C stands for surveys with citizens; A for administrative crime records obtained from police stations; O for surveys with police officers, and L for surveys with local authorities. Baseline measures are only available for a subset of outcome measures.

D   Additional Results

D.1 Disaggregating main results

Table SI-2:
Estimated Effects of Community Policing

Outcome	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Patrols, meetings and CWTs (C)	0.151	0.046	(0.058, 0.244)	0.002	
Crime victimization (C)	-0.003	0.026	(-0.055, 0.049)	0.905	0.978
Crime victimization (A)	0.513	0.257	(-0.002, 1.028)	0.051	
Perceived future insecurity (C)	0.017	0.037	(-0.057, 0.090)	0.654	0.900
Overall perceptions of police (C)	0.004	0.036	(-0.068, 0.075)	0.920	0.978
Police empathy and accountability (O)	-0.109	0.081	(-0.273, 0.054)	0.185	0.509
Experience of police abuse (C)	0.075	0.036	(0.003, 0.147)	0.041	0.227
Crime reporting (C)	-0.011	0.018	(-0.047, 0.026)	0.568	0.900
Crime tips (C)	0.010	0.022	(-0.033, 0.053)	0.648	0.900
Police abuse reporting (C/A)	0.223	0.106	(0.010, 0.436)	0.041	0.227
Demand for police spending (C)	0.038	0.057	(-0.076, 0.152)	0.511	0.900
Reporting to local authorities (L)	-0.003	0.094	(-0.192, 0.187)	0.978	0.978
Referral to police by local authorities (L)	0.158	0.115	(-0.073, 0.389)	0.176	0.509
Perceived police intentions (C)	0.007	0.026	(-0.046, 0.060)	0.790	
Knowledge of criminal justice (C)	0.008	0.012	(-0.017, 0.032)	0.529	
Norms of cooperation with police (C)	-0.032	0.022	(-0.077, 0.012)	0.150	
Perceived police capacity (C)	-0.019	0.024	(-0.067, 0.029)	0.424	
Perceived police responsiveness (C)	0.028	0.041	(-0.054, 0.110)	0.498	
Satisfaction with courts (C)	-0.022	0.043	(-0.108, 0.065)	0.622	

Letters in parentheses denote the source of outcome and covariate data. C stands for surveys with citizens; A for administrative crime records obtained from police stations; O for surveys with police officers, and L for surveys with local authorities. p-values for analyses involving main survey outcomes are adjusted using the pre-registered Benjamini and Hochberg adjustment.

Table SI-3:
Estimates Effects of Community Policing - Constituent Outcomes

Index	Outcome	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Patrols, meetings and CWTs (C)	Foot patrol frequency	-0.039	0.069	(-0.177, 0.099)	0.574	
Patrols, meetings and CWTs (C)	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.056	0.061	(-0.067, 0.179)	0.365	
Patrols, meetings and CWTs (C)	Community meeting awareness	0.311	0.070	(0.171, 0.451)	0.000	
Patrols, meetings and CWTs (C)	Active neighborhood watch team	0.203	0.076	(0.051, 0.356)	0.010	
Patrols, meetings and CWTs (C)	Watch team patrols	0.180	0.083	(0.014, 0.346)	0.034	
Crime victimization (A)	Violent crimes	0.554	0.248	(0.056, 1.051)	0.030	
Crime victimization (A)	Non-violent crimes	0.448	0.292	(-0.139, 1.035)	0.132	
Violent crimes (A)	Armed robbery	0.556	0.431	(-0.308, 1.420)	0.203	
Violent crimes (A)	Assault	0.554	0.238	(0.077, 1.031)	0.024	
Violent crimes (A)	Sexual violence	0.363	0.286	(-0.212, 0.937)	0.211	
Violent crimes (A)	Domestic abuse	0.114	0.235	(-0.357, 0.585)	0.629	
Violent crimes (A)	Murder	0.690	0.357	(-0.026, 1.406)	0.059	
Violent crimes (A)	Other violent crimes	0.770	0.451	(-0.135, 1.676)	0.094	
Non-violent crimes (A)	Burglary	0.681	0.378	(-0.077, 1.440)	0.077	
Non-violent crimes (A)	Other non-violent crimes	0.010	0.327	(-0.646, 0.665)	0.977	
Crime victimization (C)	Violent crimes (personal)	0.011	0.020	(-0.029, 0.052)	0.575	0.929
Crime victimization (C)	Non-violent crimes (personal)	0.002	0.019	(-0.036, 0.040)	0.922	0.929
Crime victimization (C)	Violent crimes (comm.)	0.005	0.059	(-0.112, 0.123)	0.929	0.929
Crime victimization (C)	Non-violent crimes (comm.)	-0.056	0.045	(-0.147, 0.034)	0.217	0.929
Crime victimization (C)	Land conflict property (personal)	0.019	0.060	(-0.101, 0.140)	0.748	0.929
Crime victimization (C)	Land conflict violent (personal)	0.008	0.041	(-0.074, 0.091)	0.839	0.929
Crime victimization (C)	Land conflict violent (comm.)	-0.013	0.043	(-0.099, 0.074)	0.772	0.929
Violent crimes (personal) (C)	Armed robbery (personal)	0.032	0.025	(-0.019, 0.083)	0.215	
Violent crimes (personal) (C)	Simple assault (personal)	0.000	0.019	(-0.037, 0.037)	0.999	
Violent crimes (personal) (C)	Other violent crimes (personal)	0.019	0.033	(-0.047, 0.085)	0.574	
Non-violent crimes (personal) (C)	Burglary (personal)	0.003	0.019	(-0.034, 0.040)	0.868	
Non-violent crimes (personal) (C)	Other non-violent crimes (personal)	-0.028	0.040	(-0.107, 0.052)	0.488	
Violent crimes (comm.) (C)	Armed robbery (comm.)	0.037	0.047	(-0.057, 0.131)	0.434	
Violent crimes (comm.) (C)	Aggravated assault (comm.)	0.016	0.026	(-0.035, 0.068)	0.528	
Violent crimes (comm.) (C)	Simple assault (comm.)	0.025	0.034	(-0.044, 0.094)	0.476	
Violent crimes (comm.) (C)	Sexual assault (comm.)	0.021	0.055	(-0.089, 0.131)	0.705	
Violent crimes (comm.) (C)	Domestic abuse (comm.)	-0.021	0.069	(-0.160, 0.118)	0.762	
Violent crimes (comm.) (C)	Murder (comm.)	-0.042	0.092	(-0.226, 0.141)	0.645	
Violent crimes (comm.) (C)	Other violent crimes (comm.)	-0.012	0.018	(-0.048, 0.023)	0.488	
Non-violent crimes (comm.) (C)	Burglary (comm.)	-0.060	0.046	(-0.151, 0.032)	0.195	

Non-violent crimes (comm.) (C)	Other non-violent crimes (comm.)	0.058	0.040	(-0.023, 0.139)	0.157	
Perceived future insecurity (C)	Feared violent crime	0.046	0.051	(-0.056, 0.148)	0.373	0.833
Perceived future insecurity (C)	Fear non-violent crime	0.070	0.056	(-0.042, 0.182)	0.213	0.833
Perceived future insecurity (C)	Feared walking	0.012	0.037	(-0.062, 0.086)	0.745	0.833
Perceived future insecurity (C)	Unsafe walking at night	-0.011	0.051	(-0.112, 0.091)	0.833	0.833
Perceived future insecurity (C)	Unsafe home at night	-0.011	0.043	(-0.097, 0.075)	0.801	0.833
Overall perceptions of police (C)	Trust in police	0.025	0.050	(-0.075, 0.124)	0.623	0.879
Overall perceptions of police (C)	Trust in service of police	-0.008	0.051	(-0.110, 0.095)	0.879	0.879
Overall perceptions of police (C)	Not intimidated police	-0.015	0.041	(-0.098, 0.068)	0.716	0.879
Police empathy and accountability (O)	Police corruption idx.	-0.179	0.120	(-0.421, 0.063)	0.144	0.300
Police empathy and accountability (O)	Police abuse idx.	-0.037	0.158	(-0.356, 0.282)	0.818	0.818
Police empathy and accountability (O)	Police accountability idx.	-0.125	0.085	(-0.297, 0.047)	0.150	0.300
Police empathy and accountability (O)	Empathy idx.	-0.106	0.112	(-0.331, 0.119)	0.348	0.464
Police corruption idx. (O)	Hypothetical 2: own misconduct (corruption)	-0.108	0.163	(-0.437, 0.221)	0.511	
Police corruption idx. (O)	Hypothetical 2: others' misconduct (corruption)	-0.132	0.195	(-0.526, 0.261)	0.501	
Police corruption idx. (O)	Hypothetical 3: own misconduct (corruption)	-0.296	0.136	(-0.570, -0.023)	0.035	
Police corruption idx. (O)	Hypothetical 3: others' misconduct (corruption)	-0.206	0.135	(-0.477, 0.066)	0.134	
Police abuse idx. (O)	Hypothetical 5: own misconduct	-0.095	0.137	(-0.372, 0.182)	0.494	
Police abuse idx. (O)	Hypothetical 5: others' misconduct	0.018	0.197	(-0.378, 0.415)	0.926	
Police accountability idx. (O)	Police takes complaints seriously	-0.270	0.126	(-0.523, -0.016)	0.037	
Police accountability idx. (O)	Hypothetical 2: disciplinary punishment	-0.121	0.171	(-0.466, 0.225)	0.485	
Police accountability idx. (O)	Hypothetical 2: report fellow officer	-0.208	0.184	(-0.579, 0.162)	0.263	
Police accountability idx. (O)	Hypothetical 2: reports by other officers	-0.153	0.159	(-0.473, 0.168)	0.342	
Police accountability idx. (O)	Hypothetical 3: disciplinary punishment	-0.067	0.133	(-0.334, 0.201)	0.618	
Police accountability idx. (O)	Hypothetical 3: report fellow officer	-0.242	0.165	(-0.574, 0.090)	0.149	
Police accountability idx. (O)	Hypothetical 3: reports by other officers	-0.133	0.204	(-0.544, 0.279)	0.519	
Police accountability idx. (O)	Hypothetical 5: disciplinary punishment	-0.095	0.142	(-0.381, 0.192)	0.509	
Police accountability idx. (O)	Hypothetical 5: report fellow officer	0.003	0.219	(-0.439, 0.445)	0.991	
Police accountability idx. (O)	Hypothetical 5: reports by other officers	-0.045	0.160	(-0.367, 0.277)	0.778	
Empathy idx. (O)	Empathy (complaints)	0.101	0.123	(-0.147, 0.350)	0.416	
Empathy idx. (O)	Empathy (reports)	-0.311	0.170	(-0.655, 0.033)	0.075	
Experience of police abuse (C)	Police abuse	0.015	0.041	(-0.068, 0.098)	0.723	0.723
Experience of police abuse (C)	Bribe frequency	0.083	0.041	(0.002, 0.165)	0.045	0.134
Experience of police abuse (C)	Bribe amount	0.121	0.080	(-0.040, 0.282)	0.137	0.205
Crime reporting (C)	Violent crimes reported (personal)	-0.002	0.036	(-0.073, 0.069)	0.950	0.997
Crime reporting (C)	Non-violent crimes reported (personal)	0.062	0.039	(-0.017, 0.141)	0.120	0.842
Crime reporting (C)	Violent crimes reported (comm.)	0.020	0.064	(-0.107, 0.148)	0.752	0.967
Crime reporting (C)	Non-violent crime reported (comm.)	0.005	0.049	(-0.093, 0.103)	0.919	0.997
Crime reporting (C)	Resolution of crime index	-0.010	0.029	(-0.068, 0.048)	0.731	0.967

Crime reporting (C)	Would report armed robbery	-0.079	0.046	(-0.172, 0.013)	0.092	0.842
Crime reporting (C)	Would report burglary	-0.057	0.054	(-0.165, 0.052)	0.298	0.967
Crime reporting (C)	Would report theft	-0.025	0.059	(-0.143, 0.093)	0.671	0.967
Crime reporting (C)	Would report domestic violence	0.003	0.060	(-0.117, 0.123)	0.960	0.997
Crime reporting (C)	Armed robbery reported (personal)	-0.068	0.066	(-0.200, 0.064)	0.309	0.967
Crime reporting (C)	Burglary reported (personal)	-0.055	0.058	(-0.172, 0.062)	0.353	0.967
Crime reporting (C)	First report theft	-0.018	0.053	(-0.124, 0.087)	0.731	0.967
Crime reporting (C)	Animal theft resolution	-0.044	0.051	(-0.147, 0.059)	0.398	0.967
Crime reporting (C)	First report domestic violence	-0.009	0.054	(-0.116, 0.099)	0.869	0.997
Crime reporting (C)	First report land conflict	-0.053	0.034	(-0.122, 0.015)	0.125	0.842
Crime reporting (C)	Land conflict resolution	-0.035	0.048	(-0.131, 0.062)	0.473	0.967
Crime reporting (C)	Share info burlgary	-0.042	0.039	(-0.121, 0.037)	0.290	0.967
Crime reporting (C)	Share info theft	-0.028	0.041	(-0.111, 0.055)	0.501	0.967
Crime reporting (C)	Share info dom. viol.	0.011	0.045	(-0.079, 0.101)	0.806	0.989
Crime reporting (C)	Aggravated assault reported (personal)	-0.041	0.029	(-0.100, 0.018)	0.166	0.894
Crime reporting (C)	Defilement reported (personal)	-0.014	0.042	(-0.097, 0.070)	0.745	0.967
Crime reporting (C)	Rape reported (personal)	0.000	0.038	(-0.077, 0.077)	1.000	1.000
Crime reporting (C)	Physical abuse reported (personal)	0.114	0.048	(0.017, 0.211)	0.022	0.601
Crime reporting (C)	Verbal abuse reported (personal)	0.011	0.032	(-0.054, 0.076)	0.731	0.967
Crime reporting (C)	Verbal abuse reported (comm.)	-0.013	0.034	(-0.082, 0.055)	0.704	0.967
Crime reporting (C)	Mob violence reported (comm.)	0.049	0.059	(-0.070, 0.167)	0.415	0.967
Crime reporting (C)	Riot reported (comm.)	0.032	0.061	(-0.091, 0.154)	0.606	0.967
Violence crimes rep. (personal) (C)	Armed robbery reported (personal)	0.000	0.039	(-0.079, 0.078)	0.994	
Violence crimes rep. (personal) (C)	Simple assault reported (personal)	-0.004	0.028	(-0.060, 0.052)	0.884	
Violence crimes rep. (personal) (C)	Other violent crimes reported (personal)	0.000	0.037	(-0.073, 0.073)	0.996	
Non-violence crimes rep. (personal) (C)	Burglary reported (personal)	0.081	0.040	(0.001, 0.160)	0.048	
Non-violence crimes rep. (personal) (C)	Other non-violent crimes reported (personal)	-0.043	0.030	(-0.103, 0.018)	0.162	
Violence crimes rep. (comm.) (C)	Armed robbery reported (comm.)	0.039	0.052	(-0.065, 0.143)	0.453	
Violence crimes rep. (comm.) (C)	Aggravated assault reported (comm.)	0.011	0.037	(-0.064, 0.085)	0.776	
Violence crimes rep. (comm.) (C)	Simple assault reported (comm.)	0.011	0.035	(-0.060, 0.081)	0.761	
Violence crimes rep. (comm.) (C)	Sexual assault reported (comm.)	0.062	0.068	(-0.074, 0.198)	0.366	
Violence crimes rep. (comm.) (C)	Domestic physical abuse reported (comm.)	-0.016	0.041	(-0.098, 0.066)	0.702	
Violence crimes rep. (comm.) (C)	Murder reported (comm.)	-0.024	0.085	(-0.195, 0.148)	0.784	
Violence crimes rep. (comm.) (C)	Other violent crime reported (comm.)	0.006	0.017	(-0.028, 0.041)	0.715	
Non-violence crimes rep. (comm.) (C)	Burglary reported (comm.)	-0.002	0.050	(-0.102, 0.097)	0.960	
Non-violence crimes rep. (comm.) (C)	Other non-violent crime reported (comm.)	0.038	0.040	(-0.042, 0.117)	0.347	
Resolution of crime index (C)	Burglary resolution	-0.040	0.039	(-0.118, 0.038)	0.309	
Resolution of crime index (C)	Domestic abuse resolution	0.060	0.054	(-0.049, 0.169)	0.278	
Resolution of crime index (C)	Armed robbery resolution	-0.051	0.034	(-0.118, 0.017)	0.140	

Crime tips (C)	Contacted police for suspicious activity	0.006	0.039	(-0.072, 0.083)	0.883	0.883
Crime tips (C)	Gave information to police	-0.014	0.034	(-0.083, 0.054)	0.672	0.883
Crime tips (C)	Share info indirectly	0.077	0.036	(0.005, 0.149)	0.037	0.077
Crime tips (C)	Assist investigation indirectly	0.088	0.036	(0.016, 0.161)	0.017	0.077
Crime tips (C)	Share info armed robbery	-0.005	0.034	(-0.073, 0.063)	0.876	0.883
Crime tips (C)	Share info theft	-0.088	0.041	(-0.171, -0.005)	0.039	0.077
Police abuse reporting (C/A)	Reported drinking on duty	0.023	0.048	(-0.073, 0.119)	0.628	0.628
Police abuse reporting (C/A)	Reported police beating	0.042	0.051	(-0.060, 0.145)	0.412	0.628
Police abuse reporting (C/A)	Reported police abuse	0.003	0.005	(-0.008, 0.014)	0.605	0.628
Police abuse reporting (C/A)	Police misconduct	0.833	0.408	(0.016, 1.651)	0.046	0.184
Reporting to local authorities (L)	Would refer land dispute	0.091	0.128	(-0.165, 0.347)	0.481	0.721
Reporting to local authorities (L)	Would refer violent land dispute	-0.086	0.101	(-0.288, 0.116)	0.399	0.721
Reporting to local authorities (L)	Would refer chicken theft	0.046	0.129	(-0.213, 0.304)	0.724	0.724
Referral to police by local authorities (L)	Would refer motor bike theft	0.153	0.125	(-0.098, 0.405)	0.225	0.395
Referral to police by local authorities (L)	Would refer grave domestic assault	0.107	0.095	(-0.083, 0.298)	0.263	0.395
Referral to police by local authorities (L)	Would refer domestic violence	-0.016	0.114	(-0.246, 0.213)	0.887	1.000
Referral to police by local authorities (L)	Likely asked to adjudicate land dispute	-0.198	0.104	(-0.407, 0.012)	0.064	0.191
Referral to police by local authorities (L)	Likely asked to adjudicate chicken theft	0.000	0.108	(-0.217, 0.217)	1.000	1.000
Referral to police by local authorities (L)	Likely asked to intervene in domestic violence	0.195	0.088	(0.019, 0.372)	0.031	0.184
Perceived police intentions (C)	Police will investigate	-0.063	0.048	(-0.158, 0.033)	0.192	
Perceived police intentions (C)	Police will be fair	0.017	0.051	(-0.085, 0.119)	0.738	
Perceived police intentions (C)	Political interest idx.	-0.004	0.034	(-0.072, 0.065)	0.917	
Perceived police intentions (C)	Police take job seriously	0.053	0.052	(-0.052, 0.157)	0.319	
Perceived police intentions (C)	Police care	0.058	0.048	(-0.038, 0.154)	0.229	
Perceived police intentions (C)	Police are committed	0.025	0.037	(-0.049, 0.100)	0.497	
Perceived police intentions (C)	Police investigate without pay	-0.033	0.042	(-0.117, 0.050)	0.429	
Perceived police intentions (C)	Facilitation is unacceptable	0.011	0.029	(-0.047, 0.070)	0.702	
Perceived police intentions (C)	Criminal pay to go free unlikely	-0.028	0.048	(-0.125, 0.069)	0.564	
Perceived police intentions (C)	Police treat men and women equally	0.030	0.046	(-0.062, 0.121)	0.520	
Perceived police intentions (C)	Police treat rich and poor equally	0.030	0.048	(-0.067, 0.126)	0.539	
Perceived police intentions (C)	Police take burglary seriously	-0.033	0.059	(-0.152, 0.086)	0.581	
Perceived police intentions (C)	Police fair burglary	0.037	0.049	(-0.061, 0.134)	0.458	
Perceived police intentions (C)	Police take theft seriously	-0.031	0.052	(-0.136, 0.074)	0.554	
Perceived police intentions (C)	Police fair theft	0.005	0.046	(-0.088, 0.098)	0.921	
Perceived police intentions (C)	Police take dom. viol. seriously	-0.080	0.044	(-0.168, 0.008)	0.075	
Perceived police intentions (C)	Police fair dom. viol.	0.041	0.042	(-0.043, 0.126)	0.331	
Perceived police intentions (C)	Right amount of force	-0.023	0.049	(-0.121, 0.075)	0.637	
Perceived police intentions (C)	Punish for reporting unlikely	0.008	0.033	(-0.058, 0.075)	0.805	
Political interest idx. (C)	Police are not corrupt	-0.037	0.032	(-0.101, 0.027)	0.249	

Political interest idx. (C)	Police serve equally	0.032	0.046	(-0.061, 0.125)	0.494
Knowledge of criminal justice (C)	Legal knowledge idx.	0.042	0.020	(0.001, 0.083)	0.044
Knowledge of criminal justice (C)	Reporting knowledge idx.	0.043	0.034	(-0.025, 0.111)	0.209
Knowledge of criminal justice (C)	Legal knowledge (report misconduct)	0.020	0.039	(-0.057, 0.097)	0.606
Knowledge of criminal justice (C)	Legal knowledge (drop case)	0.045	0.038	(-0.031, 0.120)	0.243
Knowledge of criminal justice (C)	Legal knowledge (defilement)	0.067	0.055	(-0.044, 0.178)	0.232
Knowledge of criminal justice (C)	Legal knowledge (LC1 chairperson)	-0.031	0.055	(-0.141, 0.079)	0.572
Knowledge of criminal justice (C)	Legal knowledge (child labor)	-0.055	0.040	(-0.135, 0.025)	0.173
Knowledge of criminal justice (C)	Legal knowledge (mob violence)	-0.040	0.045	(-0.131, 0.051)	0.381
Knowledge of criminal justice (C)	Police knowledge (phone number)	-0.018	0.027	(-0.072, 0.037)	0.518
Legal knowledge idx. (C)	Legal Knowledge (suspect)	0.079	0.040	(-0.000, 0.159)	0.051
Legal knowledge idx. (C)	Legal Knowledge (lawyer)	0.018	0.035	(-0.051, 0.088)	0.595
Legal knowledge idx. (C)	Legal Knowledge (fees)	0.107	0.051	(0.004, 0.210)	0.042
Legal knowledge idx. (C)	Legal Knowledge (vaw)	-0.033	0.036	(-0.106, 0.040)	0.369
Reporting knowledge idx. (C)	Police Knowledge (followup)	0.063	0.035	(-0.006, 0.132)	0.074
Reporting knowledge idx. (C)	Police Knowledge (where is station)	0.023	0.052	(-0.082, 0.127)	0.666
Norms of cooperation with police (C)	Reporting norm (theft)	-0.091	0.053	(-0.197, 0.016)	0.093
Norms of cooperation with police (C)	Reporting norm (domestic abuse)	0.020	0.047	(-0.075, 0.115)	0.673
Norms of cooperation with police (C)	Obey police norm	0.001	0.045	(-0.090, 0.091)	0.989
Norms of cooperation with police (C)	Bystander report armed robbery	-0.099	0.046	(-0.192, -0.006)	0.037
Norms of cooperation with police (C)	Bystander report burglary	-0.065	0.043	(-0.151, 0.020)	0.130
Norms of cooperation with police (C)	Bystander report animal theft	-0.035	0.045	(-0.126, 0.056)	0.449
Norms of cooperation with police (C)	Bystander report dom. viol.	0.045	0.045	(-0.045, 0.135)	0.318
Perceived police capacity (C)	Police timeliness	-0.041	0.037	(-0.115, 0.033)	0.276
Perceived police capacity (C)	Police investigation capacity	-0.028	0.034	(-0.095, 0.040)	0.414
Perceived police capacity (C)	Police aware of challenges	0.002	0.046	(-0.090, 0.095)	0.959
Perceived police responsiveness (C)	Police responsive to complaints	0.015	0.046	(-0.077, 0.107)	0.746
Perceived police responsiveness (C)	Police consider opinions	0.031	0.042	(-0.053, 0.115)	0.461
Satisfaction with courts (C)	Courts punish timely	-0.011	0.046	(-0.104, 0.081)	0.806
Satisfaction with courts (C)	Courts punish appropriately	-0.021	0.039	(-0.099, 0.058)	0.601

Letters in parentheses denote the source of outcome and covariate data. C stands for surveys with citizens; A for administrative crime records obtained from police stations; O for surveys with police officers, and L for surveys with local authorities. For main outcomes, p-values for all constituent items of a given index are adjusted using the pre-registered Benjamini and Hochberg adjustment.

D.2   Heterogeneous treatment effects

	Treatment			Treatment × Intimidated			N
	estimate	S.E.	p-value	estimate	S.E.	p-value	
Patrols, meetings and CWTs (C)	0.154	0.051	0.003	0.110	0.056	0.053	2943
Crime victimization (C)	0.015	0.034	0.654	-0.068	0.042	0.113	2944
Perceived future insecurity (C)	0.003	0.044	0.943	-0.008	0.043	0.846	2941
Overall perceptions of police (C)	-0.004	0.034	0.901	0.041	0.048	0.403	2944
Experience of police abuse (C)	0.070	0.034	0.044	-0.007	0.082	0.933	2943
Crime reporting (C)	0.009	0.021	0.661	-0.051	0.018	0.007	2944
Crime tips (C)	-0.020	0.027	0.467	0.042	0.043	0.333	2943
Police abuse reporting (C/A)	0.264	0.109	0.019	-0.110	0.063	0.084	2943
Demand for police spending (C)	0.005	0.078	0.947	0.080	0.116	0.491	2944
Perceived police intentions (C)	0.006	0.028	0.829	0.012	0.035	0.737	2944
Knowledge of criminal justice (C)	0.028	0.017	0.116	-0.038	0.024	0.116	2944
Norms of cooperation with police (C)	-0.014	0.032	0.662	-0.052	0.042	0.216	2943
Perceived police capacity (C)	-0.042	0.031	0.188	0.053	0.050	0.291	2923
Perceived police responsiveness (C)	0.022	0.047	0.644	0.017	0.064	0.786	2939
Satisfaction with courts (C)	-0.074	0.055	0.183	0.083	0.072	0.247	2922

Table SI-4: Heterogeneous effects of community policing by whether respondent was intimidated by police at baseline

Estimates stem from a specification that regresses the outcome on an indicator for treatment assignment, an indicator for whether the respondent indicated at baseline that she was afraid of the police, the interaction between the two as well as a baseline measure of the outcome (where available) and block fixed effects. The sample only includes respondents for whom baseline measures are available. Hence, indicators for missingness in baseline measures of the outcome do not show any variation and are omitted from the specification. The columns labelled "Treatment" pertain to estimates of effects among respondents who were not afraid of police at baseline. The columns labelled "Treatment × Intimidated" pertain to the difference in effects across respondents who were and were not afraid of police at baseline.

	Treatment			Treatment × Woman			N
	estimate	S.E.	p-value	estimate	S.E.	p-value	
Patrols, meetings and CWTs (C)	0.154	0.051	0.003	-0.007	0.051	0.893	3456
Crime victimization (C)	0.012	0.034	0.720	-0.031	0.033	0.346	3456
Perceived future insecurity (C)	0.047	0.040	0.251	-0.060	0.042	0.162	3456
Overall perceptions of police (C)	0.042	0.045	0.357	-0.076	0.050	0.131	3456
Experience of police abuse (C)	0.129	0.063	0.045	-0.107	0.066	0.108	3455
Crime reporting (C)	-0.006	0.023	0.796	-0.009	0.022	0.686	3456
Crime tips (C)	0.019	0.033	0.577	-0.018	0.041	0.664	3456
Police abuse reporting (C/A)	0.237	0.108	0.033	-0.028	0.033	0.397	3456
Demand for police spending (C)	0.027	0.079	0.732	0.021	0.105	0.842	3456
Perceived police intentions (C)	0.011	0.031	0.726	-0.008	0.033	0.818	3456
Knowledge of criminal justice (C)	0.012	0.015	0.433	-0.007	0.018	0.688	3456
Norms of cooperation with police (C)	-0.036	0.033	0.282	0.006	0.036	0.859	3456
Perceived police capacity (C)	-0.052	0.031	0.101	0.066	0.044	0.138	3454
Perceived police responsiveness (C)	0.068	0.050	0.183	-0.080	0.052	0.127	3455
Satisfaction with courts (C)	-0.034	0.050	0.501	0.024	0.063	0.707	3430

Table SI-5: Heterogeneous effects of community policing by gender

Estimates stem from a specification that regresses the outcome on an indicator for treatment assignment, an indicator for whether the respondent is a woman, the interaction between the two as well as a baseline measure of the outcome (where available), an indicator for missingness in this baseline measure and block fixed effects. The columns labelled "Treatment" pertain to estimates of effects among men. The columns labelled "Treatment × Intimidated" pertain to the difference in effects across men and women.

	Treatment			Treatment × High Prior			N
	estimate	S.E.	*p*-value	estimate	S.E.	*p*-value	
Patrols, meetings and CWTs (C)	0.150	0.054	0.007	0.059	0.064	0.359	2944
Crime victimization (C)	-0.043	0.025	0.086	0.051	0.044	0.245	2946
Perceived future insecurity (C)	0.023	0.039	0.549	-0.036	0.043	0.415	2943
Overall perceptions of police (C)	0.009	0.049	0.854	0.019	0.058	0.744	2945
Experience of police abuse (C)	0.061	0.042	0.149	0.041	0.108	0.705	2945
Crime reporting (C)	-0.027	0.020	0.197	0.026	0.026	0.316	2946
Crime tips (C)	-0.007	0.021	0.723	0.039	0.063	0.541	2944
Police abuse reporting (C/A)	0.185	0.098	0.063	0.062	0.053	0.251	2944
Perceived police intentions (C)	-0.001	0.035	0.973	0.012	0.036	0.734	2945
Knowledge of criminal justice (C)	0.009	0.016	0.602	0.003	0.026	0.910	2946
Norms of cooperation with police (C)	-0.033	0.033	0.319	-0.011	0.051	0.837	2944
Perceived police capacity (C)	-0.035	0.031	0.270	0.041	0.060	0.494	2924
Perceived police responsiveness (C)	-0.010	0.064	0.877	0.068	0.072	0.347	2941

Table SI-6: Heterogeneous effects of community policing by prior beliefs

Estimates stem from a specification that regresses the outcome on an indicator for treatment assignment, an indicator for whether the respondent's baseline score of the outcome fell above the median of baseline scores, the interaction between the two as well as block fixed effects. The columns labelled "Treatment" pertain to estimates of effects among respondents who had low prior beliefs along the respective dimension at baseline. The columns labelled "Treatment × High Prior" pertain to the difference in effects across respondents with low and high prior beliefs at baseline. The analysis is based on respondents for whom baseline measures are available and the table includes all outcomes for which baseline measures were collected.

	Treatment			Treatment × High Satisfaction			N
	estimate	S.E.	*p*-value	estimate	S.E.	*p*-value	
Patrols, meetings and CWTs (C)	0.241	0.046	0.000	-0.082	0.054	0.137	2944
Crime victimization (C)	-0.034	0.034	0.324	0.034	0.044	0.440	2945
Perceived future insecurity (C)	0.039	0.044	0.377	-0.085	0.051	0.101	2942
Overall perceptions of police (C)	0.006	0.046	0.899	0.021	0.055	0.704	2945
Experience of police abuse (C)	0.048	0.050	0.346	0.037	0.092	0.691	2944
Crime reporting (C)	-0.033	0.023	0.156	0.040	0.023	0.095	2945
Crime tips (C)	-0.005	0.031	0.881	0.006	0.048	0.905	2944
Police abuse reporting (C/A)	0.187	0.107	0.086	0.057	0.043	0.187	2944
Demand for police spending (C)	0.037	0.084	0.662	0.034	0.108	0.753	2945
Perceived police intentions (C)	0.001	0.030	0.973	0.028	0.027	0.291	2945
Knowledge of criminal justice (C)	-0.005	0.018	0.766	0.029	0.026	0.255	2945
Norms of cooperation with police (C)	-0.060	0.033	0.072	0.051	0.044	0.251	2944
Perceived police capacity (C)	0.001	0.042	0.990	-0.034	0.054	0.527	2924
Perceived police responsiveness (C)	0.026	0.051	0.618	0.019	0.049	0.700	2940
Satisfaction with courts (C)	0.029	0.052	0.570	-0.120	0.067	0.080	2923

Table SI-7: Heterogeneous effects of community policing by prior satisfaction with police

Estimates stem from a specification that regresses the outcome on an indicator for treatment assignment, an indicator for whether the respondent's baseline score of the "Overall perceptions of police" index fell above the median, the interaction between the two as well as a baseline measure of the outcome (where available) and block fixed effects. The sample only includes respondents for whom baseline measures are available. Hence, indicators for missingness in baseline measures of the outcome do not show any variation and are omitted from the specification. The columns labelled "Treatment" pertain to estimates of effects among respondents who had low prior satisfaction with police at baseline. The columns labelled "Treatment × High Prior" pertain to the difference in effects across respondents with low and high prior satisfaction with police at baseline.

	Treatment			Treatment × NRM Stronghold			N
	estimate	S.E.	p-value	estimate	S.E.	p-value	
Patrols, meetings and CWTs (C)	0.024	0.079	0.766	0.209	0.106	0.057	3408
Crime victimization (C)	-0.015	0.061	0.807	0.025	0.077	0.749	3408
Crime victimization (A)	0.355	0.567	0.534	0.287	0.728	0.695	71
Perceived future insecurity (C)	-0.028	0.076	0.716	0.079	0.098	0.428	3408
Overall perceptions of police (C)	-0.002	0.067	0.982	0.008	0.093	0.936	3408
Police empathy and accountability (O)	-0.050	0.121	0.688	-0.063	0.167	0.708	193
Experience of police abuse (C)	0.005	0.057	0.936	0.121	0.086	0.173	3407
Crime reporting (C)	-0.042	0.031	0.185	0.059	0.045	0.198	3408
Crime tips (C)	0.035	0.039	0.384	-0.036	0.052	0.492	3408
Police abuse reporting (C/A)	0.194	0.153	0.219	0.064	0.247	0.798	3408
Demand for police spending (C)	-0.076	0.082	0.366	0.206	0.121	0.099	3408
Reporting to local authorities (L)	0.149	0.158	0.357	-0.287	0.184	0.129	284
Referral to police by local authorities (L)	-0.118	0.212	0.584	0.458	0.277	0.108	284
Perceived police intentions (C)	0.005	0.051	0.924	0.004	0.070	0.955	3408
Knowledge of criminal justice (C)	0.025	0.024	0.304	-0.030	0.030	0.328	3408
Norms of cooperation with police (C)	-0.017	0.039	0.667	-0.009	0.049	0.852	3408
Perceived police capacity (C)	-0.025	0.036	0.502	0.003	0.055	0.952	3406
Perceived police responsiveness (C)	0.007	0.065	0.909	0.022	0.100	0.828	3407
Satisfaction with courts (C)	-0.087	0.077	0.275	0.109	0.101	0.287	3382

Table SI-8: Heterogeneous effects of community policing by whether respondent lives in an NRM stronghold

Estimates stem from a specification that regresses the outcome on an indicator for treatment assignment, an indicator for whether more than 60% of votes went to the NRM in the respondent's parish in the 2016 general elections, the interaction between the two as well as a baseline measure of the outcome (where available) and block fixed effects. The columns labelled "Treatment" pertain to estimates of effects among respondents who do not live in an NRM stronghold. The columns labelled "Treatment × NRM Stronghold" pertain to the difference in effects across respondents who live and do not live in an NRM stronghold.

	Treatment			Treatment × NRM Supporter			N
	estimate	S.E.	p-value	estimate	S.E.	p-value	
Patrols, meetings and CWTs (C)	0.142	0.073	0.056	0.013	0.070	0.848	2384
Crime victimization (C)	0.075	0.056	0.186	-0.094	0.054	0.083	2384
Perceived future insecurity (C)	0.040	0.059	0.500	-0.033	0.064	0.602	2384
Overall perceptions of police (C)	0.004	0.056	0.943	0.012	0.062	0.847	2384
Experience of police abuse (C)	0.087	0.060	0.153	0.020	0.084	0.814	2384
Crime reporting (C)	-0.016	0.029	0.581	0.002	0.030	0.939	2384
Crime tips (C)	0.015	0.038	0.685	-0.024	0.044	0.591	2384
Police abuse reporting (C/A)	0.187	0.096	0.058	0.072	0.112	0.522	2384
Demand for police spending (C)	0.049	0.109	0.657	0.023	0.134	0.864	2384
Perceived police intentions (C)	0.004	0.045	0.921	0.005	0.049	0.925	2384
Knowledge of criminal justice (C)	0.031	0.020	0.133	-0.060	0.025	0.021	2384
Norms of cooperation with police (C)	-0.060	0.039	0.128	0.020	0.049	0.687	2384
Perceived police capacity (C)	-0.093	0.049	0.060	0.062	0.058	0.294	2383
Perceived police responsiveness (C)	0.045	0.069	0.519	-0.016	0.074	0.831	2383
Satisfaction with courts (C)	-0.088	0.076	0.248	0.082	0.087	0.349	2369

Table SI-9: Heterogeneous effects of community policing by partisanship

Estimates stem from a specification that regresses the outcome on an indicator for treatment assignment, an indicator for whether the respondent feels close to the NRM, the interaction between the two as well as a baseline measure of the outcome (where available), an indicator for missingness in this baseline measure and block fixed effects. The columns labelled "Treatment" pertain to estimates of effects among those who do not feel close to the NRM. The columns labelled "Treatment × NRM Supporter" pertain to the difference in effects across those who do and do not feel close to the NRM. Analyses are based on a subset of respondents who have been asked about their partisanship during a follow-up survey that took place after our endline survey. In other words, this analysis is based on the assumption that the community policing treatment does not affect partisan identification.

	Treatment			Treatment × Limited resources			N
	estimate	S.E.	p-value	estimate	S.E.	p-value	
Patrols, meetings and CWTs (C)	0.180	0.078	0.029	-0.056	0.107	0.600	3456
Crime victimization (C)	0.070	0.041	0.098	-0.142	0.052	0.010	3456
Crime victimization (A)	0.253	0.278	0.367	0.518	0.524	0.328	72
Perceived future insecurity (C)	0.040	0.067	0.551	-0.046	0.086	0.598	3456
Overall perceptions of police (C)	-0.042	0.063	0.511	0.090	0.084	0.294	3456
Police empathy and accountability (O)	-0.131	0.113	0.261	0.105	0.191	0.586	197
Experience of police abuse (C)	0.032	0.043	0.463	0.094	0.094	0.321	3455
Crime reporting (C)	0.019	0.025	0.450	-0.060	0.040	0.143	3456
Crime tips (C)	0.039	0.035	0.268	-0.059	0.048	0.227	3456
Police abuse reporting (C/A)	0.389	0.152	0.016	-0.341	0.246	0.175	3456
Demand for police spending (C)	0.044	0.088	0.623	-0.006	0.132	0.963	3456
Reporting to local authorities (L)	-0.049	0.134	0.714	0.107	0.195	0.589	288
Referral to police by local authorities (L)	0.039	0.191	0.841	0.238	0.276	0.394	288
Perceived police intentions (C)	-0.007	0.041	0.857	0.025	0.061	0.680	3456
Knowledge of criminal justice (C)	0.030	0.015	0.054	-0.045	0.024	0.070	3456
Norms of cooperation with police (C)	-0.018	0.032	0.584	-0.031	0.044	0.479	3456
Perceived police capacity (C)	-0.056	0.033	0.097	0.065	0.058	0.273	3454
Perceived police responsiveness (C)	-0.003	0.070	0.965	0.058	0.096	0.549	3455
Satisfaction with courts (C)	-0.007	0.065	0.909	-0.029	0.088	0.744	3430

Table SI-10: Heterogeneous effects of community policing by whether police station is well resourced

Estimates stem from a specification that regresses the outcome on an indicator for treatment assignment, an indicator for whether the police station scored below the median of an index of police station resources based on information collected at baseline, the interaction between the two as well as a baseline measure of the outcome (where available) and block fixed effects. The resource index is made up of the following variables: number of officers, number of motor cycles, size of monthly fuel allowance, crime registration book available, station diary in good condition. The columns labelled "Treatment" pertain to estimates of effects among respondents who live in jurisdictions of stations with above-median resources. The columns labelled "Treatment × Limited resources" pertain to the difference in effects across respondents who live in jurisdictions in stations with below-median and above-median resource levels.

D.3 Effects of secondary treatment

Figure SI-1: Estimated Effects of Community Watch Team Support

Estimated effect of secondary treatment with 95% confidence intervals

Estimates stem from a specification that regresses the outcome on an indicator for assignment to the main treatment, an indicator for assignment to the secondary treatment as well as on a baseline measure of the outcome, an indicator missingness in this baseline measure and block fixed effects. The estimates shown in the table pertain to the coefficient on the indicator for assignment to the secondary treatment which reflects the additional effect of the secondary treatment among respondents who live in the jurisdiction of a police station that was also assigned to the main treatment. Letters in parentheses denote the source of outcome and covariate data. C stands for surveys with citizens; A for administrative crime records obtained from police stations; O for surveys with police officers; and L for surveys with local authorities. p-values for analyses involving main survey outcomes are adjusted using the pre-registered Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) adjustment.

Table SI-11:
Estimated Effects of Community Watch Team Support

Outcome	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Patrols, meetings and CWTs (C)	0.007	0.059	(-0.110, 0.124)	0.901	
Crime victimization (C)	0.032	0.033	(-0.033, 0.097)	0.333	0.667
Perceived future insecurity (C)	0.004	0.040	(-0.075, 0.082)	0.926	0.926
Overall perceptions of police (C)	-0.043	0.039	(-0.119, 0.034)	0.272	0.667
Experience of police abuse (C)	0.093	0.067	(-0.039, 0.225)	0.166	0.632
Crime reporting (C)	0.032	0.024	(-0.016, 0.079)	0.190	0.632
Crime tips (C)	0.009	0.032	(-0.055, 0.074)	0.771	0.908
Police abuse reporting (C/A)	0.028	0.088	(-0.147, 0.202)	0.753	0.908
Demand for police spending (C)	-0.197	0.086	(-0.366, -0.027)	0.023	0.233
Reporting to local authorities (L)	-0.040	0.175	(-0.386, 0.305)	0.817	0.908
Referral to police by local authorities (L)	0.066	0.189	(-0.308, 0.441)	0.727	0.908
Perceived police intentions (C)	-0.026	0.030	(-0.084, 0.033)	0.388	
Knowledge of criminal justice (C)	-0.016	0.018	(-0.052, 0.021)	0.397	
Norms of cooperation with police (C)	0.052	0.032	(-0.012, 0.116)	0.111	
Perceived police capacity (C)	-0.009	0.031	(-0.070, 0.051)	0.767	
Perceived police responsiveness (C)	-0.037	0.043	(-0.122, 0.049)	0.396	
Satisfaction with courts (C)	0.000	0.058	(-0.116, 0.115)	0.996	

Estimates stem from a specification that regresses the outcome on an indicator for assignment to the main treatment, an indicator for assignment to the secondary treatment as well as on a baseline measure of the outcome, an indicator missingness in this baseline measure and block fixed effects. The estimates shown in the table pertain to the coefficient on the indicator for assignment to the secondary treatment which reflects the additional effect of the secondary treatment among respondents who live in the jurisdiction of a police station that was also assigned to the main treatment. Letters in parentheses denote the source of outcome and covariate data. C stands for surveys with citizens; A for administrative crime records obtained from police stations; O for surveys with police officers, and L for surveys with local authorities. p-values for analyses involving main survey outcomes are adjusted using the pre-registered Benjamini and Hochberg adjustment.

D.4   Effects on perceptions of local police

	Estimate	S.E.	p-value	N
Local police care about community's views (C)	0.034	0.051	0.510	3447
Local police perform well (C)	0.013	0.045	0.770	3443
Local police have enough ressources (C)	0.001	0.052	0.985	3343

Table SI-12: Effects of community policing on citizen perceptions of local police

D.5   Effects on behavioral outcomes

	Estimate	S.E.	p-value	N
Citizen shared contact info with police (C)	-0.029	0.035	0.406	3456
Citizen donated to CWT (C)	0.040	0.049	0.422	3456
Amount citizen donated to CWT (C)	0.072	0.051	0.165	3448

Table SI-13: Effects of community policing on behavioral outcomes

E   Attrition

	Replaced	
	Citizens	Officers
	(1)	(2)
Community Policing	−0.015	−0.007
	(0.014)	(0.057)
Control Mean	0.155	0.802
p-value	0.303	0.893
Stations	72	71
Block FE	yes	yes
Observations	3,456	217

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table SI-14: Estimated effect of community policing on whether respondents were replaced

The dependent variable is an indicator for whether a respondent was replaced. Estimates stem from a specification that regresses the indicator for replacement on a treatment assignment indicator and block fixed effects. Standard errors allow for clustering on the police station level. The first column pertains to citizens and the second to police officers.

	p-value	N
Citizens	0.342	3456
Officers	0.878	217

Table SI-15: F-test of treatment-by-covariate interactions in models of attrition

P-values come from an F-test that compares the following two models. The full model regresses an indicator for whether a respondent was replaced on an indicator for treatment assignment and all treatment-by-covariate interactions using a selection of baseline covariates. The nested model restricts all interaction terms to be zero. Both the general and the nested model also include indicators for missing values in the baseline measures, where those exist. These missing values have been imputed with zeros. Row 1 pertains to citizens. The set of eight baseline covariates used for this test has been pre-registered. Row 2 pertains to officers. No selection of covariates has been pre-registered for the officer test. The set of covariates used for the officer test includes age, gender as well as the four sub-indices that make up the main outcome index "Police empathy and accountability" (see table SI-3).